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the after-turret. Though badly battered,

the Seydlitz, managed to get back to port.

The truth is that more British ships

than German ships were sunk. Yet the

battle was a British victory. Even while

publishing news of victory and encouraging

their people to believe that the British had

lost the supremacy of the seas, the German

High Command realized that they had

been defeated. Their failure in the next

two years and a half again to challenge

the British fleet to action conclusively

settles this point. After the armistice

was signed, German naval officers confessed that the battle caused the German

crews to realize that their fleet was outclassed. Before the encounter, the sailors

would have welcomed with cheers the order

to go out and fight; thereafter such an

order would probably have provoked a

mutiny-and in the end did so. After

the Jutland Battle, the German naval

authorities concentrated more and more

of their energies upon U-boats, and the

above-water fleet was neglected. Meanwhile, the British added dreadnought

after dreadnought to their fleet, and,

during the last year of the war, had the

aid of American dreadnoughts. Thus the

odds became more and more uneven. The

fact is that the Germans would have had

more of a chance of winning had they elected

to fight in the early weeks of the war.

So long, however, as the German fleet

remained in being, it constituted a serious

menace to the Allies and rendered necessary

constant watchfulness on their part. The

Germans well understood the advantage

of this fact and were careful not to take

any risk of losing it. Furthermore, the

War Lords always sought to bolster up

the hopes of their people by pretending

that some day the fleet would issue from

its lair and win command of the seas.

Admiral Jellicoe's book, published after

the war, reveals many interesting facts