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but all such hopes were doomed to disappointment when. in October, Bulgaria,

encouraged by the failure of the Allies

at the Dardanelles, threw in her lot with

Turkey and the Central Powers, and

joined in a campaign that quickly resulted

in the overrunning of Servia and the

linking up of Turkey with her northern

allies. It now became clearly apparent

that with the munitions and other assistance that Turkey could receive from Germany, the task of opening the strait

was hopeless, and it was equally apparent

that, even if opened, it could not be

kept so. General Hamilton was relieved

of his command by General Sir Charles

Monro, and, with the help of the navy,

the Suvla Bay and Anzac positions were

evacuated in December and that at the

tip of the peninsula in January. The

withdrawal was made with skill and with

trifling loss.

The losses that had gone before, however,

had been enormous. The British losses

alone, including 96,000 invalided home

on account of illness, amounted to about

198,000 men, of whom over 25,000 had

been killed and about 12,000 captured.

The French losses, including sick, were

about 35,000.

The causes of the great failure were

numerous. For one thing, the Turks

and their German advisers had displayed

remarkable skill in defense, and the Turkish

soldier had once more shown that, when

properly trained and led, he was the equal

of any in the world. Teutonic victories

in Galicia and Poland had prevented

the sending of Russian aid, while Teutonic

diplomatists in the Balkans had ultimately

been able to create a situation that rendered

Allied failure inevitable. For the rest,

the Allied Governments and the Allied

generals and admirals had been guilty of

fatal indecision and procrastination. The

vital importance of time in warfare was

one which the Allies had not yet learned.

Furthermore, though their troops had

fought with a gallantry unsurpassed in the

annals of warfare, they were for the most

part men fresh from civil life, and in large

measure were led by officers who were

new to their work. The failure was

another example added to the long list

which proves to any man who has wit

enough to read the truth that raw troops

led by raw officers, no matter how brave

they all may be individually, are unequal

to serious warfare. Only when they have

been seasoned by actual campaigning,

as General Jackson's frontiersmen at New

Orleans had been seasoned in the war

against the Creeks, can volunteers hope to

meet trained soldiers on anything approaching equal terms.

The effects of the Dardanelles fiasco

were enormous. It discouraged the Allies,

and it decided the wavering Ferdinand

of Bulgaria to cast in his lot with the

Central Powers. The conquest of Servia

and Montenegro was the direct result

of that failure, while the length of the

war was undoubtedly increased by many


Nevertheless the enterprise had some

compensating advantages. The losses of

the Turks were probably as great, if not

greater, than those of the Allies. The