is granted, Congress is the judge whether the law passed for the purpose of executing that power is necessary and proper," and that "the true and only test is to inquire whether the law is intended and calculated to carry out the object, whether it devises and creates an instrumentality for executing the specific power granted, and if the answer be in the affirmative the law is constitutional," and then to say, after this test has been applied, and Congress has passed judgment, that another department of the Government, as the President, or the judiciary, or another government, as a State, may take up the case thus decided by the tribunal having, under the Constitution, competent jurisdiction, and make a different decision. It is, I believe, an established principle in all civilized nations that when a court of competent jurisdiction, unless guilty of fraud or mistake, has finally decided a case, the judgment is conclusive upon all parties.
But you say you never asserted nor intended to assert that the judgment of Congress was conclusive against a State. Pardon me for saying that you did assert that Congress is the judge, and that you did not qualify the assertion by saying "the judge" in the first instance, nor did you annex any other qualification favor of the rights of a State or any other party. I had, therefore, no right to suppose that you intended to ingraft exceptions upon a rule which you laid down in the plainest terms, without exception.
I make the above references to your former letter to show that I had no disposition to do you injustice, and that I do not consider that I misrepresented your position as contained in your letter. The thousands of intelligent citizens in different parts of the Confederacy who have placed upon your letter the same construction which I had will doubtless be gratified that you now disclaim the dangerous doctrine as to the power of Congress to which your strong, unqualified language seemed clearly to connect you.
In reference to the publication by you of the two letters containing part of our correspondence, I need only say that you had devoted a large portion of your letter to a reply to my argument, which was before you, and had, in the same letter, for the first time, given the arguments by which you maintain your own position. These I had never seen, and, as you had replied at length to my argument, it was, I think, but fair and just, according to all rules of discussion, that I have an opportunity to reply to yours, and that the whole case be submitted to the country together. Unless there were important reasons of state which, in your judgment, made it necessary to place the discussion before the country incomplete, in order to satisfy the discontent which existed in the public mind on account of what a very large proportion of our people regard a dangerous usurpation, or unless other good reasons existed for a departure from the usual rule in such cases, I am unable to see why the whole correspondence, when given to the public, should not have gone through the usual official channels.
I have certainly had no wish to protract the discussion of this question further than duty and justice to the people of this State required. I feel that I cannot close, however, without again earnestlyttention to a question which you must admit is "practical. " I think I have established beyond doubt in my former letters the constitutional right of the State of Georgia to appoint the officers to command the regiments and battalions which she has sent into the service of the Confederate State in compliance with requisitions made by you upon her Executive for "organized bodies" of