correctness of the definition. All persons, therefore, who are enrolled for discipline under the laws of Georgia constitute her militia. When the persons thus enrolled (the militia) are employed in the service of the Confederate States the Constitution expressly reserves to Georgia the appointment of the officers. The conscription act give the President the power by compulsion to employ every one of those persons between eighteen and thirty-five in the service of the Confederate States and denies to the State the appointment of a single officer to command them while thus employed. Suppose Congress at its next session should extend the act so as to embrace all between eighteen and forty-five, what is the result? The body of soldiers in the State enrolled for discipline are every man employed in the service of the Confederacy and the right is denied to the State to appoint a single officer, when the Constitution says she shall appoint them all. Is it fair to conclude, when the States expressly and carefully reserved the control of their own militia by reserving the appointment of the officers to command them, that they intended under the general grant of power to raise armies to authorize Congress to defeat the reservation and control the militia with their officers by calling the very same men into the field, individually and not collectively, organizing them according to its own will, and terming its action raising an army and not calling forth the militia? Surely the great men of the Revolution, when they denied to the General Government the appointment even of the general officers to command the militia when employed in the service of the Confederacy, did not imagine that the time would come so soon when that Government, under the power to raise armies, would claim and exercise the authority to call into the field the whole, militia of the States individually, and deny to the States the appointment of the lowest lieutenant, and justify the act on the ground that Congress did not choose to call them into service in their collective capacity, and deny that they were militia if called into service in any other way. If Congress has the power to call forth the whole enrolled force or militia of the States in the manner provided by the conscription act there is certainly no obligation upon Congress ever to call them forth, in any other manner, and it rests in the discretion of Congress whether or not the States shall ever be permitted to exercise their reserved right, as Congress has the power in every case to defeat the exercise of the right by calling forth the militia under a conscription act and not by requisitions made upon the States. It cannot be just to charge the States witaking this important reservation, subject to any such power in Congress to render it nugatory at its pleasure. Again you say:
Congress may call forth the militia to execute Confederate laws; the State has not surrendered the power to call them forth to execute State laws. Congress may call them forth to repel invasion; so may the State, for it has expressly reserved this right. Congress may call them forth to suppress insurrection, and so may the State.
If the conscription laws is to control, and Congress may, without the consent of the State government, order every man composing the militia of the State out of the State into the Confederate service, how is the State to call forth her own militia, as you admit she has reserved the right to do, to execute her own laws, suppress an insurrection in her midst, or repel an invasion of her own territory? Could it have been the intention of the States to delegate to Congress the power to take from them, without their consent, the means of self-preservation by depriving them of all the strength upon which their very existence depends?