and military, shall enter the armies of the Confederacy as privates under officers appointed by the President, and that the Army shall from time to time be recruited from other State officers as they may be appointed by the States. To state the case in different form: Congress has the power under the twelfth paragraph of the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution to disband the State governments and leave the people of the States with no other government than such military despotism as Congress in the exercise of the specific power to raise armies (which I understand you to hold is a distinct power to be construed separately) may, after an application of your test, judge to be best for the people. For, as all the State officers which I mention might make effective privates in the armies of the Confederacy and as the law passed to compel them to enter the service might create an instrumentality for executing the specific power to raise armies, Congress, the judge, need only so decide and the act would be constitutional. I may be reminded, however, that Congress passed an exemption act after the passage of the conscription act, which exempts the Governors of the States, the members of the State Legislatures, the judges of the State courts, &c., from the obligations to enter the military service of the Confederacy as privates under Confederate officers. it must be borne in mind, however, that this very act of exemption by Congress is an assertion of the right vested in Congress to compel them to go when Congress shall so direct, as Congress has the same power to repeal which it had to pass the exemption act. All the State officers, therefore, are exempt frby the grace and special favor of Congress and not by right, as the governments of the independent States whose agent and not master Congress has been erroneously supposed to be. If this doctrine be correct, of what value are State rights and State sovereignty? In my former letter I insisted under the general rule that the twelfth, fifteenth, and sixteenth paragraphs of the section under consideration, all relating to the same subject-matter, should be construed together. While your language on this point is not so clear as in other parts of your letter, I understand you to take issue with me here. You say:
Nothing can so mislead as the construe together and as one whole the carefully separate clauses which definite the different powers to e exercise over distinct subjects by Congress.
These are not carefully separated clauses which relate to different powers to be exercised over distinct subjects. They all relate to the same subject-matter, the authority given to Congress over the question of war and peace. They all relate to the use of armed force by authority of Congress. If, therefore, Coke, Blackstone, and Mansfield, of England, and Marshall, Kent, and Story, of this country, with all other intelligent writers on the rules of construction, are to be respected as authority, there can, it would seem, be no doubt of the correctness of the position that these three paragraphs, together with all others in the Constitution which relate to the same subject-matter, are to be construed together as one whole. Construe them together and the general language in one paragraph is so qualified by another paragraph upon the same subject-matter that all can stand together, and the whole when taken together establishes to my mind the unsoundness of your argument and the fallacy of your conclusion. But I must not omit to notice your definition of the term militia and the deductions which you draw from it. You adopt the definition of the Attorney-General that the militia are a body of soldiers in a State enrolled for discipline. Admit, for the purpose of the argument, the