War of the Rebellion: Serial 127 Page 0795 CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES.

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am of the vital necessity of adhering to the rule you had adopted on this subject form the very beginning of the war, I have steadily resisted all importunity to receive troops for a less period than three years or the war, unless they furnish their own arms. On first entering on the duties of the Department the tenders of troops were very large, and it was not at all unusual for me to refuse offers of 5,000 men per day. Very soon it was ascertained throughout the country that the War Department could not be importuned into receiving unarmed men for twelve months, and the impetuous ardor of our people to rush to the defense of their liberties tenders of troops for the war. A number of such regiments had already been organized, more were in progress and the policy of the Administration was on the eve of being crowned with entire success, when it was embarrassed and impeded by a very unexpected cause. In several of the States the Governors, apprehensive of attack at home, and actuated by the natural desire of aiding in the defense of their own States, failed to perceive that the only effective means of attaining that end was by a concentration of the common strength under one head, and that an enemy as that which we are now combating could result in nothing but the defeat of each in detail. In disregard of so obvious a truth several of the States undertook to raise independent armies to repel invasion, retained at home arms and munitions, and called for volunteers for home service for short terms, alluring them by proposals to arm and equip them and retain them solely for service within the State. The fatal effects of so short-sighted a policy became instantly apparent. Companies already organized and ready to be mustered into the Confederate service for the war marched out of their camps of rendezvous to enlist in State service for three, four, or six months, and State commissaries and quartermasters established themselves as rival purchasers at posts where Confederate officers were stationed, thus subserving the ends of speculators and stimulating their constantly increasing exactions. Confusion was also introduced into military operations; officers became doubtful as to their duties and positions; State and Confederate engineers and other officers were liable to be ordered each to perform the same duty by independent commanders, and nothing but inefficiency and disaster could be expected from such a system. It is, of course, not within the power of the Confederate Government, otherwise than by the weight of its counsels, to prevent such action as that to which I have just referred on the part of the several States, unwise and disastrous as may be its effects, but it is surely competent for the Congress to declare that no State can expect its expenditures on such objects to be reimbursed. The waste of money resulting from these short enlistments is enormous. The assertion is by no means extravagant that a long war conducted by six-months' volunteers would cost three times as much as the same war conducted by three-years' volunteers, without taking into consideration the great difference in the efficiency of each of these classes of troops after the lapse of the first six months. In the single item of transportation, which is a heavy burden on the Treasury, the cost for the former would be sixfold that of the latter. There is, therefore, no justice or propriety in imposing upon the Confederacy, which is conducting a common war at the common expense on sound principles, the burden of any expenditures created by separate States, which may deem proper to carry on an independent system of defense so expensive and so impolitic as that to which I have