material goes, and in time of peace a portion of the soldiers might be usefully employed as workmen in such employments. The trophies of the regiment would be there; its record of its history would be there. There would be something to be proud of in the memory of its deeds and the examples set by the brave men who had composed it. This organization would also have always one-third of the force in reserve, organized to meet any raid or attack, as, if kept properly full, there would be 600 men of each regiment ready to march to a given point at a moment's notice, with instructed officers, and men more or less instructed about any attempted invasion by the enemy. The click of the telegraph would convey the order, and the railroad would concentrate an army of many thousand well-organized and instructed soldiers sooner than the invading force could march fifty miles. The expense of the nine-months" men, the six- months" men, the three-months" men, and the one-month's men that have been called out since the beginning of this war, and who have been substantially useless to the country save for the moment, would more than pay the expense of the reserve organization during the past three years. This organization should further be carried out by making each military district to be altered once in ten years, according to the change or increase of population. The constitutional rights of the States as regards militia might be provided for by allowing the Governors of States to appoint the officers upon the raising of the regiment; but after it is once mustered into the service of the United States, then the vacancies should be filled by appointments by the President, preferably from the ranks, upon some well-defined system of merit.
If it is objected that we are providing for a standing army which cannot be decreased it is answered that by reducing the force from its maximum to its minimum it is decreased about one-fourth at once, leaving the organization perfect. Then, if it should be necessary at the close of the war to decrease the force still further, it might be done by disbanding the regiments in certain of the agricultural and thinly settled districts, where plenty of profitable employment can be found, leaving only those of the city districts, where recruiting would probably keep them up. But the difficulty we have found in this war so far is not in getting rid of soldiers, but of raising them, and no one need fear, it seems to me, any trouble, on that account. This organization would be of the greatest service to the colored troops, and as they, I doubt not, are to be a permanency, they could at once be so organized. Specially would it fit them, for now their wives and families have no abiding place or home, and could and would be brought together in settlements on the lands about the homes of these regiments, when, as I suppose, these regiments would be located in the South. I would further have all courts-martial, except in cases of cashiering an officer or any offense punishable by death, held at the home battalion, and a judge-advocate to each division, to insure regularity of proceeding, to go in the field. This organization should be further perfected by making a brigade of three regiments, the effective field force of which would be at its maximum 4,800 men, at its minimum 3,600, the whole force of which would be 7,200 men, reckoning the reserves, or at the minimum 5,400 men. Two of these brigades in a division, the minimum strength of which would then be 7,200 men, which, with a proper proportion of artillery and cavalry, would make its strength about 10,000 men,