known, by a proper return, the authority under which he retains him, it is, at the same time, imperatively his duty to obey the proceeds of the United States, to hold the prisoner in custody under it, and refuse obedience to the mandate or process of any other government. And, consequently, it is his duty not to take the prisoner nor suffer him to be taken, before a State judge or court upon a habeas corpus issued under State authority. No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him, or require him to be brought before them. Send if the authority of a State, in the form of judicial process or otherwise, should attempt to control the marshal, or other authorized officer or agent of the United States in any respect, i the custody of his prisoners, it would be his duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force that might be neain the authority of law against illegal interference. No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence."
The language above cited is that of Chief Justice Taney in the decision of the Supreme. Court of the United States, in the case of Alderman vs. Booth. (21 Howard's Reports.)
If a writ habeas corpus shall have been sued out from a State court, and seared the provost-marshall while he holds the deserter under arrest, and before he has had time or opportunity to " send him to the nearest military commander or miliary post," it is the duty of the marshal to made to the court a respectful statement, in writing, as a return upon the writ, seating forth:
First. That the respondent is provost-marshal, duly appointed by the President of the United States, in accordance with the provisions of the act aforesaid.
Second. That the person held was arrested by said marshal a deserter, in accordance with the provision of the seventh section of the act aforesaid. That it is the legal duty of the respondent to deliver over said deserter "to the nearest military commander or military post," and that the respondent intends to perform such duty as soon as possible.
Third. That the production of said deserter in court would be inconsistent with and in violation of the duty of the respondent of provost-marshal, and that the said deserter is now held under authority of the United States. For there reasons, and without intending andy disrespect to the Honorable judge who issued process, he declines to produce said deserter, or to subject him to the court.
To the foregoing all other material facts may be added.
Such return having been made, the jurisdiction of the State court over that case ceases. If the State court shall proceed with the case and made any formal judgment in it, except that of dismissal, one of two courses may be taken. (1) The case may be carried up, by appeal or otherwise, to the highest court of the State, arm removed therefrom by which of error, to the Supreme Court; or, (2) the judge may be personally dealt with in accordance with law, and with such instructions as may hereafter be issued in such cases.
JAMES B. FRY,
CIRCULAR.] OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER,
Washington, D. C., July 1, 1863.
Chief signal officers of departments or army corps are instructed to proceed at once to enlisted and e-enlist men for the Signal Corps, U. S. Army, after passing the required examination, for the period of two or three years or the war.
Enlisted men now upon duty in the corps may be transferred for the balance of their unexposed term of service.
Transfers to the corps of men now serving in it may be made in accordance with General orders (from the War Department), Numbers 106.* By order of the Signal Officer of the Army:
HENRY S. TAFFT,
Captain and Signal Offer.
* See p. 172.