us must be affected by the passion which distrubed us. The more intimately related the more profoundly they must be disturbed. Great Britain and France, most intimately related, must be the two States most vehemently excited. Excitement would rise later in those countries than here and would subside more rapidly. The culmination at home or abroad could be hastened or delayed by accidents.
The Trent affair was such an accident. It has served to bring on the crisis. The crisis has been reached and passed at home and of course abroad. Reason is beginning to regain its control here and with it the Government is beginning to recover its authority. We are having and we shall continue to have success at home and so we may reckon on peace abroad.
* * * * *
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
WILLIAM H. SEWARD.
LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, March 20, 1862.
Honorable WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State, Washington.
SIR: * * * I take it for granted that even in the midst of your engrossing occupations you find sufficient time to glance at the report of the debates in Parliament on subjects of interest to the United States, and more especially on international questions of rights on the ocean and blockade in time of war.
The most marked indication to be observed is the general sense of uneasiness at the change operated in the position of Great Britain as a maritime power by the enlargement gradually making of the privileges of neutral nations. Whilst on the opposition side you perceive a distinct disapproval of the agreement made in 1856 at Paris, there is equally perceptible among the ministers a disposition to seize the first opportunity to annul the obligatiosn which it has been thought to impose. The remarks of Sir George Cornewall Lewis upon the effects of war upon the measure regarded merely as a treaty and not as new rules incorporated into the internationl law are full Lord Palmerston has been not inappropriately reminded of the difference between the tone of his speech at Liverpool in 1856 and of that in the late debate, whilst even Lord Russell is quoted as having expressed the opinion that some modification of the declaration of Paris would seem to be almost indispensable.
Such are the immediate effects of that which at first blush appeared to these enlightened gentlemen a great triumph in the case of the Trent. Such are the consequences of refusing to accept the adhesion of the United States to the declaration of Paris from an overzealous desire to escape the effects of a precipitate admission of belligerent rights. Both these events have brought vividly to their observation the consideration of the position of Great Britain in the contingency of a war on the ocean. Like the dog in the fable in snatching at the shadow they find they have lost the solid meat.
A conflict with the United States would as things are now at once transfer the whole carrying trade of Great Britain into the hands of the neutral nations of the continent of Europe. It is now becoming plain that without the additional provision first suggested by Mr. Marcy English interests on the sea are in great jeopardy in time of war, and yet that with the admission of it the control of the ocean is forever lost. Whichever way they look there is difficulty. Self-interest