you a copy of official report of chief quartermaster there by to-day's mail. The report referred to has just reached here, and our own report to you on the matter has been delayed by our waiting for this, which has been expected for several days. I have examined the report with some care and forward it as satisfactory, though I am not entirely convinced of the necessity for burning the transports and barges referred to. The chief quarteramster and commanding officer at Johnsonville, however, as well as the officers of the navy, all continue to aver the necessity, and, as they were on the spot at the time, it is fair to presume that they are the best judges of this. However this may be, a board of survey has already been called, and their report will probably fix the facts as nearly as we can get at them. The affair at Johnsonville is, of course, to be regretted in all respects; and yet the quarteramster's department cannot justly be hdld to blame for anything that occurred there. As soon as Hood's movements north began to threaten the line of the Tennessee, General Donaldson crowded the road to Johnsonville with all avaialble cars, to deplete the depot there, at the same time telegraphing Louisville and Saint Louis to cease shipments up the Tennessee. When the first intelligence arrived of the attack on our transports at Fort Heiman, as referred to in inclosed report, he at once applied to the major-general commanding for re-enforcements for the garrison. The reply was that re-enforcements were impossible, as all available troops were imperatively required elsewhere. Subsequently, when informed that an attack was anticipated on the town itself, he reapeated his request, with the same result as before. On a repetition of his application, and on urgent representation of the importance of defending the post, he was informed that "no troops could be detached from other points threatened" for that purpose, and that "the major-general commanding the department thought it adivsable to abandon that line of communication at once," removing all supplies. On further consultation, however, General Thomas consented to modify his views so far as to permit the quartermaster's department to take care of Johnsonville itself, if it could, so long as it was of ound practicable to do so. Left hus to his own resources, General Donaldson accordingly telegraphed the chief quartermaster at Johnsonville to hold out to the last, and then took steps to send him re-enforcements from our own military organization here.
In forming that organization he had specially agreed that the forces should be used only as a depto guard at Nashville and should never be ordered elsewhere for duty without their consent. He therefore called for volunteers and the response was over 500 men and a section of artillery. The greater part of these were at once forwarded to Johnsonville and, as it subsequently proved, arrived just at the right time. Captain Howland had already armed his own employes and the re-enforcements sent from here communicated confidence and energy to all. How well these forces bore themselves there has alaredy been communicated to you in the official report of Colonel Peterson, the commanding officer, which was forwarded to you some days ago. I think it may be fairly claimed that the quartermaster's department, unaided, saved Johnsonville, at least that portion of it that was sved at all. Not a man arrived there from any quarter until the enemy had withdrawn and the danger was all over. Then a brigade of the Army of the Ohio reached Johnsonville and Major-General Schofield arrived and assumed command. Do not understand me by these remarks to cast relfection upon the major-general commanding or any one else. Such is by no means my intention, nor do I think it deserving. On the contrary, the movements