that Morgan's whole force, about 8,000 strong, with six pieces of artillery, was around the town. About the same time I was informed that the Fifteenth Indiana Battery had left Indianapolis to report to me. Though very anxious to put out to General Love's relief, I waited for the battery, and in the meantime made every preparation for a fight. As I had to approach Vernon after night, and had reason to expect that Morgan, if he was seriously demonstrating against the place, wound attempt to prevent the re-enforcement of Love, it was necessary to anticipate as far as possible every contingency and provide against them beforehand. I made no doubt that I wound be attacked while in the cars, where my raw command be at great disadvantage. The contingencies of such an event was what I had to anticipate and provide for. This will account for the airy condition of the box-cars in my trains, which was doubtless observed by the railroad abents next morning. All my orders were promptly executed except by the captain of the battery. He was directed to harness his horses and keep them so in the cars. He neglected the order and, as a consequence, the little column had to wait for him and his battery at North Vernon until after daylight before it could move. At Columbus I procured a pilot engine and arranged signals. One long whistle from the pilot was to signify obstruction on the track; three long whistles, the enemy. At this latter my command was to disembark and form for battle. Except for these purpose the engineers received positive orders not to sound a note. To my great annoyance, however, some of them kept up their ordinary practice and whistled on their loudest key at the stations and switches. I reached North Vernon about 1 o'clock in the morning. About 6 a. m. the column started for Old Vernon, where we arrived only to be informed that Morgan had decamped with his whole force. My engineers had given him due notice of our approach, and, mounting his men, he made Dupot, some ten miles distant, by the time the battery was unloaded and in place in the column. This movement of Morgan's satisfied me of what I thought I knew before, viz, that he would no fight if he could help it; also that, as agianst him, infantry could accomplish nothing more than the defense of towns and railroad bridges. To think of catching him with footmen was folly. At Vernon General Love turned the command over to me. That officer and his subordinates are really entitled to great credit. He had, besides firmly rejecting the demand for surrender, made the best possible disposition of his little force to defend the towns, and, like his men, was willing and ready for the fight.
The commands united formed a very respectable force. I subjoin an informal report of them made to me in the morning at Vernon. To pursue Morgan on foot was what I have already stated of it. I was at first disposed to m to Madison, but concluded to wait until it was definitely ascertained where the enemy was going. It soon appreared that he was heading to the east. I then suggested throwing a force down the Lawrenceburg railroad, and telegraphed for permission to move my command to Osgood. Next day (the 13th) this permission came, and we pushed off for that place. There I telegraphed to Lawrenceburg asking citizens to collect wagons---- and meet me at----. There can be no doubt that if this plan could have been carried out Morgan could have been overtaken. He was at that time not more than twenty-five miles ahead of me and moving slowly. With the wagons, I could have made a forced march of sixty miles. Unfortunately the confusion in Dearborn County consequent upon the enemy's presence was so great as to make it impossible to procure a sufficiency of