the march will be made, and in addition a midday halt of two hours. Such wagons of the division of Generals Hood and McLaws as may not be required with those commands will be sent to their destination from this point by way of Winchester. The proper quartermaster will acompany them to make the necessary arrangements of foraging the animals and controling the movements of the trains.
By command of Lieutenant-General Longstreet:
G. M. SORREL,
June 23, 1863-11 a. m.
GENERAL: Your last none, acknowledging receipt of mine of this morning, is received. I wish you to get your corps ready to move in the morning. Let your ordnance officers see Colonel Baldwin and make arrangements to turn in the damaged ammunition and have it replace by a fresh supply, as it would be useless to take the former along. I have wished to ride over to see you, but thus far it has been impssible. If I am unable to do so this morning, cannot you come over this afternoon to my camp?
I am, respectfully and truly, yours,
R. E. LEE.
General Hill's two division (the remaining ones) have been ordered to move.
R. E. L.
CHARLESTON, S. C., June 25, 1863.
Mr. F. G. DE FONTAINE,
Spatranburg, S. C.:
DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 21st instant has been received. I send herewith for your perusal copies of four on my "Notes on the War,"
belonging to me files, marked form 1 a 5. The one I have already sent you should be marked Numbers 2. Others will be sent also. I have no doubt they will give you a somewhat clear knowledge of passing events thatn you had before. They are sent you simply for the truth of history. You understand, no doubt, the necessity of not connecting my name with them at present. After the war you will do as you please on the subject, as well in reference to others of a still greater import, but which cannot be communicated at present. Moreover, as I have already informed you, many of them are not now within my reach. With regard to the question contained in your letter, I answer as follows: First. I recommended the concentration of Johnston's and Holmes; s forces with mine at Manassas. This was at first refused by the President, but afterward allowed; too late, however, to enable the whole of Johnston's forces to participate in the battle, only one-half (about 8,000) arrived in time, thereby not only endangering the success of that day, but depriving us of troops which might have been useful employed in the purnish after the victory. I alone planned the battle of Manassas. The original plan, however, was not executed, in consequence of the order of Ewell and Holmes, on my extreme right, to commence the offensive movement on Centerville having miscarried; thence I had to change the original plan at about 11 a. m. by throwing all available forces to