June 1, 1862.
I yesterday reconnoitered Naglee's late position, the country between Nine-mile road and the river itself. The bridge proper at golding's was in progress and ought to have been completed last night, but the long log-ways of the approaches were yet to be built. I went into the swamp at six points between there and Sumner's Bridge and concluded that as far as concerned this side the river there was little choice. The road from Golding's to Couch's can always be reached by sufficient lengths of log-way. The stream proper can, of course, laways be spanned by trestle-work and sometimes by felling large trees across for girders. The points for bridges will therefore depend on the approaches of the other side. The cross-roads I found in good condition, requiring slight repairs only. The road you spoke of, cutting around Naglee's left to the enemy's rear, would have to pass through very swampy ground. When I was at Naglee's late advanced position, just before the commencement of the battle, the enemy was in very close proximity, threatening him. The defenses I arranged for Casey's late position were all incomplete. Rifle-pits hereabouts cannot be made tenable. They immediately fill with water. I have had to resort to parapets with ditches in every case.
M. D. McALESTER,
Lieutenant of Engineers.
HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS D'ARMEE,
June 1, 1862-11.30 [p.] m.
I have good reasons to believe that I shall be attacked early in the morning by 50,000 men. The bridge on the Chickahominy is so broken by the recent freshets that it cannot be repaired at once. I shall do my utmost. The trains from Richmond are running all right.*
E. V. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
RIFLE-PITS, June 1, 1862-8.30 a. m.
We are driving the enemy back. The Second Excelior drove the enemy back with the bayonet. They are falling back on the right and left on the railroad.
S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
AT RIFLE-PITS, June 1, 1862-9 a. m.
We have driven the enemy in front. I have a report that they are trying to outflank us on our left with 6,000 or 8,000 men. I need re-enforcements, as General Casey's division is not of any use, and the other division not very effective.
S. P. HEINTZELMAN,
*For reply, see Marcy to Sumner, June 2, 3 a. m., VOL. XI, Part III, p. 207.