roads to Summersville, Lewisburg, and Fayette go without tents. Our pickets on mountain paths and roads are numerous. Our working parties about 400, and the whole force is hard worked, so that we cannot throw our large bodies. Tolerably reliable information to-day came of a party trying to get a road from behind over Cotton Hill, where it commands our camp. This necessitaties new work in examining the ground there and extending some of our workw with reference to it. I expect some information t-night as to the present whereabouts of Floyd, and will send it early in the morning if I get it. Colonel Tyler was encamped at the cross-roads called Cross-Lanes, a part of his force one each road. The enemy were between him and Carnifix Ferry, about two miles from him. While his men were at breakfast in the morning they outflanked him and commenced the attack on both flanks and front nearly simultaneously. The regiment did not get in good shape for defense at any time, and was soon broken up and scattered.
J. D. COX,
AUGUST 27, 1861.
Telegraphed you a short dispatch to-day. I see nothing on the map to indicate the road you speak of to Charleston. It would be well, however, to have it examined by scouts. Nothing more to say. Keep your supplies up and clear away your waste lumber. Keep yourself and these headquarters constantly advised of the force and movement sof the enemy. There seems to be some incompatibility between the force supposed to be in your front and that in front of Cheat Mountain.
W. S. ROSECRANS.
AUGUST 27, 1861.
Your dispatch of 27th received. The commanding general is gratified with its definiteness. He regrets to say that the report concerning the Seventh furnishes another evidence of the great deficiency, not to say inefficiency and wothlessness, of the performances of picket guard duty. From what appears it is plain that no adequate picket guards were posted by Colonel Tyler, or that his position was chosen without precaution. The duty with which he was charged required him to keep his regiment posted in mass in a position where his retreat could not be cut off, with strong picket guards and advanced pickets thrown well to the front to give timely notice of the enemy's approach and check any movement except in force. The commanding general hopes that this most unfortunate lesson will not be lost on the rest of his command. While he takes pleasure in saying your reports indicate better precautions, he hopes you will take occasion to deepen the lesson we have learned at such cost.
[GEO. L. HARTSUFF,