his lines and permitted Grant again to concentrate a large force against the third and last section of that army. Not once during the entire campaign did he act on the maxim of attacking the foe in detail, a rule peculiarly applicable when an army is contending against an enemy superior in numers. The fmiliar historical example of the war conducted by Frederick the Great against three armies, the junction of any two would have caused the downfall of his State, illustrates the value of this maxim, and serves to show how much, under the most adverse conditions, may be achieved by a general who, to professional skill, unit genius and energy.
No sooner hald the enemy commenced investing Jackson than General Johnston pronouced it untenable. He had been there for many weeks, and to insure the successful defense of the place left Grdner's army at Hudson to its fate. Yet when the moment of trial came he dicided that the lines of defense had been badly lecated, and that the works were so imperfect and insufficient as to render the position untenable. Week had been passed by the genral commanding in the town with any army of between 20,000 men under his orders, and he had neither remedied defective location of lines nor given the works the requisite strength. Jackson was evacuated, and General Johnston withdrew his army to Eastern Mississippi. The evacuation of Jackson, as of Centerville, was marked by one of the most serious and irreparable sacrifices of property that has occurred during the war-a loss for which, in my judgment, no sufficient explantion has been given. The railroad bridge across the Pearl River at Jackson had been broked. It was necessary to rebuild it sufficiently to remove cars across, and there was a very large accumulation of rolling-stock on the western side of the stream which, without the bridge, could not be saved if Jackson were avacuated. Under these circumstances General Johnston, with over 20,000 men, suffered this gap to reamin without an effort to fill it, although the work could with little dofficulty have been completed in a manner to answer the requirements of theoccasion. In consequence of this neglect a very large number of locomotives, said to be about ninety, and several hundred cars, were lost. We have never recovered from the infury to the transportation service occasioned by this failure on his part.
General Johnston's second campagn thus colosed with the loss of every important position which the enemy had attacked. Not only was Vicksburg forced to surrender, with its garrison, but Port Hudson, with its garrison had been captured when he was able to relieve it, but abstained from amking the movement lest he should thereby hazard the safety of Jackson, which, in its turn, was lost with the sacrifice of mostvaluable property. My confidense in General Johnston's fitness for separate command was now destoyed. The proof was too complete to admit of longer doubt that he was deficient in enterprise, tardy in movement, defective in prepration, and singularly neglectful of the duty of preserving our means of supply and transportation, asthough experience should have taught him the difficulty of procuring them. It should be added, that neither in this nor in his previous command had it been possible for me to obtain form General Johnoston any communications of his plans or purposes beyond vague statements of an intention to counteract the enemy as their plans might be developed. No indication was ever presented to induce the belief that he considered it proper to form combinations for attack as well as defense, and nothing is more certain than the final success of an enemy who with superior forces can contiue his operations with-