least an equal number of men. The deficiency of some 9,000 men can only be drawn in season for the emergency from General Lee's army, and I would urge that that number of men be held ready to be detached for the service, in time to effect a junction with the other troops to be concentrated at Fayetteville. We could then confidently attack Sherman, except to destroy his army, and be left free at once to effect a junction with General Lee with all our forces, except perhaps Bragg's corps, which might be required to watch Schofield. We could then attack Grant with superior numbers, and defeat him signally. Should Sherman, however, be able to effect a junction with Schofield, he will then have about 50,000 men, a force which would be too large to contend with, as arranged in the foregoing sketch. In such a contingency I can see no other means of preventing the complete attainment of the main objects of Sherman's campaign than by the prompt evacuation of our lines at Petersburg, and the occupation of those, prepared for such an emergency, around Richmond, and by detaching 25,000 men to united with the force already in North Carolina, and give immediate battle to Sherman, which could be done with almost certain decisive success. After which the whole army should be hastened back to Virginia to raise the siege of Richmond. Present events tending to force the evacuation of Richmond, it would seem a necessary part of the strategy of the campaign that the Confederate States Government should be previously removed to some point that would free the army from the necessity of protecting it, and thus at the same time diminish the importance which the enemy attaches to Richmond as the capital of the Confederate States.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
CHARLOTTE, N. C., March 1, 1865.
Brigadier General G. J. RAINS,
Chief Torpedo Bureau:
GENERAL: I have the honor to state that as per your order I reported at the headquarters of General Beauregard on ther duty with subterra shells. General Hampton, with whom I was assigned for service, desired me to embed a causeway, eleven miles below Columbia, which he said was the only passage for the enemy there, as an impenetrable morass lay on either side. With all possible dispatch I made ready for the work, and had all things in readiness by 7 a. m. on the day following, at which tiem Major Rhett, the quartermaster of the post, had promised transportation should be furnished. The hour came, and three successive hours, but no transportation, Major R. stating that all his wagons were employed in sending stores beyond the enemy's reach. By 12 o'clock I received the loan of a lady's ambulance and hurried to the front, but the causeway by that time had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and Columbia soon followed. General Hampton furnished me with two excellent horses, but had no wagon. This, however, was after the city was abandoned. He is now wanting me with him, but nothing can be done without means. From Columbia to Camden has been such a field for the work that I return heart-sick at nothing being done. Much may yet be done between Camden and Raleigh, Wilmington, or what point soever the enemy may be destined for. Give me the following and I ask for no more: A light, strong spring-wagon, with water-proof cover; tow good horses and a driver; a good horse, bridle, and saddle for sentinel; a pick or grub-