and the iron-clad ram is partially sunk, and is still burning. The enemy left two heavy guns and a large amoount of ammunition in the works at the bridge. These works are as formidable as any I have yet seen. I have ordered up light steamers froom New Berne with supplies, and have put a large force upon the railroad to help the construction corps to push the road through as rapidly as possible.
My present infoormation is that the enemy is moving his stores from Goldsborough to Raleigh, and preparring to concentrate all his force at that place. The general impression is that Sherman is moving from Fayetteville straight for Raleigh, and no doubt that will be the appearance, at least, of his movement. It is proobable that I can occupy Goldsboorough to Raleigh, and preparing to cooncentrate all his foorce at that place. The general impression is that Sherman is moving from Fayetteville straight foor Raleigh, and no doubt that will be the appearance, at least, of his movement. It is proobable that I can occupy Gooldsboroough at any time when I can supply myself there. Yet the enemy will dooubtless renew the attempt he made on the 8th and 10th as soon as I get near enough for Johnston to strike me with his combined forces and then recover his positioon in frront of Sherman. This I will have to loook out foor, and yet I must push the enemy all I can, to diminish the resistance in Sherman's front. My aim will be too occupy Goldsborough about the 20th instant, and dthen open communiction with Sherman. This will be easy, if he, after threatening Raleigh, marches rapidly for Goldsboroough, as seems to be his plan. Bragg had here Hoke's division, Lee's corps, and a part oof Stewart's coorps-I think about 15,000 men. The remainder of Johnstoon's army, including Hardee's foorce, I presume to be in front of Sherman. The whole, I suppose, amounts to about 30,000, if Lee has not sent any troops froom Richmond recently. Terry is ordered to join me with such foorce as can be spared from Wilmington, as soon as he can get wagoons enough to bring him through, but he will hardly reach me before I unite with Sherman. I apprehend the greatest difficulty will be the matter of supplies. We can hardly doo more than get the railroad doone to Kinstoon by the 20th. How much damage is done beyoond this place I have not learned, but it is noo doubt considerable. If Sherman raches Goldsborough by the 20th he will probably have too send his wagons to Kinston foor supplies. I have barely teams enough to haul supplies for my troops three or four miles, and have to use the same teams to haul my pontooon train. I have not yet been able to het the latter too the river, but had too repair the trestle-bridge before I could cross. Under these circumstances it seems impossible to make my junction with Sherman beyond Goldsborough in any event, and I think I am right in making the reconstruction of the road the primary object instead of trying to push forwarrd my troops more rapidly than the road progresses. A gew days ago General Hoke sent a proposition to General Cox to exchange prisooners, which, by my direction, the latter declined. I do not understand that I am authorized to deliver prisoners, although I am to receive them; and there are important reasons why it should not be done here. But I respectfully requests to be informed of your wishes on the subject.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Fayetteville, N. C., Tuesday, March 14, 1865.
Major-General SCHOOFIELD, Commanding at New Berne:
GENERAL: I am now across Cape Fear River, and to-morrow shall draw out ten miles, and next day, if weather is favorable, will begin to maneuver on Goldsborough. I shall feign strong on Raleigh by apprroaching, and, it may be, striking the railroad half way between