that Richmond also was evacuated. I succeeded in capturing 200 or 300 prisoners, stragglers, principally, from the retreating army, and returned to camp, leaving a force at Chester Station. Directions meantime had arrived from General Grant to connect my pickets with those of the Army of the Potomac on Swift Creek; but, as the position I held was already some miles in advance of that line, I informed the general commanding of the fact, and maintained my original position. The next day I received instructions to proceed to Petersburg with a portion of my force and occupy the city and defenses, still holding with a small force the Bermuda Hundred line. Soon afterward the line of the South Side Railroad, from Sutherland's Station to and including City Point, was placed under my command. My command was not afterward engaged in active operations of any kind. It fluctuated a great deal in size and duties, but, without any data at hand, I am unable to give dates and details. I remained in Petersburg during the time you continued to command the Department of Virginia. I had neither precedent nor, until you returned to Richmond, instructions in the management of the negro or other questions under my control, but from first to last there was no trouble in my district, and I left it quiet and prosperous.
I am very sorry I must make this report so general in its statements, and submit it asking due allowance and consideration for the circumstances under which it is made.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. L. HARTSUFF,
Asst. Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, Late Major-General Vols.
[General E. O. C. ORD.]
HEADQUARTERS DEFENSES OF BERMUDA HUNDRED, VA.
I have just sent the following instructions to General Ferrero:
GENERAL: If the enemy has not replied to our fire on our right and center you had better send out a column to attack and capture their picket-line at that point, if possible. If this develops the fire of their batteries in force let the column withdraw; if not, push and successes you may obtain, even to the capture of their main line, holding the remainder of your command ready to support the attacking column. We must not let the enemy leave our line without our knowing it. If at any time or in any manner in the course of executing the above directions you learn positively of the continuance of the enemy in force on any part of this line, do not push the reconnaissance any farther, as the object of the movement will then by accomplished. Do this as soon as possible.
GEO. L. HARTSUFF,
HEADQUARTERS DEFENSES OF BERMUDA HUNDRED,
April 2, 1865.
My demonstrations this morning resulted in developing the enemy in force along his line. They were driven from their picket-line for more than half a mile with ease, and six of their pickets captured. Our advance was then opened upon by artillery throughout the whole of their line which bore upon it. Having heard from the prisoners