I give here the report of casualties in the fifth Army Corps, March 29, 1865:
Command Officers Men Officers Men
Cavalry escort, ........ ..... ........ 3
headquarters Fifth Army
Artillery ........ 1 1 3
First Division 5 47 18 275
Second Division ........ ...... ........ .....
Third Division ........ ...... ........ 6
Total 5 48 19 287
Command Officers Men Officers Men Aggregate
Cavalry escort, ....... .... ....... 3 3
Artillery ....... ..... 1 4 5
First Division ....... 22 23 344 367
Second Division ....... .... ....... ..... .........
Third Division ....... .... ....... 6 6
Total ....... 22 24 357 381
During the evening of the 29th the following dispatch was received from General Meade's assistant adjutant-general-Colonel Ruggles:
Major-General Warren will advance his line at 6 a. m. to-morrow, letting his relight rest over and across the Quaker road and his left extending as far as i consistent with a due covering and guarding of his flank.
Major-General Humphreys will at the same time advance his line, keeping his left connected with Major-General Warren and throwing his right forward as far as Crow's. The object of this movement is to force the enemy into his line of works and develop the same, and, if he is found out of his line, to give battle. Corps commanders will endeavor to have reserves suitably posted lang their lines, and will render each other such mutual support as the exigencies of the hour may demand.
This was succeeded by the following from General Webb, chief of staff, written at 9.20 p. m., received at 11 p. m.:
The major-general commanding directs me to state that from your dispatch he infers that the main points of the order now sent to you have been practically carried out by General Griffin. You will, however, determine this definitely in the morning, and the enemy being driven within hoes works, you will extend your line to the left and will determine the position of his works. General Humphreys will push on, and will do the same in his front. You will develop to your left as far as possible consistent with the instructions to protect your flank.
In accordance with the above I issued the following order at 11.20 p. m.:
Division commanders will hold their commands in readiness at 6 a. m. to-morrow either to advance upon the enemy or to repel any attempt upon his part. The order is to advance.
It began to rain during the night, and continued on through out the 30th, sometimes falling heavily. This made the roads and fields almost impracticable for artillery and filled the swamps with water. Heavy details had to be sent back to assist the trains, which were nearly immovable in the mud.
At 5.50 a. m. I sent the following to General Webb:
I have my command all in readiness, but my advance is so far ahead of General Humphreys and in sight of the enemy across the open ground that I do not think it advisable to attempt anything more northward until General Humphreys gets into position on my right. My left, on the plank road, cannot be extended with propriety till I can get some idea of General Sheridan's movement, and now rests on Gravelly Run, and, if I move, it will in the air. I believe I am now in the best position I can be, unless an assault is intended on the enemy's lines near the Quaker road. I cannot move forward, and it does not appear a favorable place in front of Griffin.
At 6 a. m. I sent the following to General Humphreys, commanding Second Corps:
I do not think it best to advance any farther till General Miles gets up in position on my right, which, as the woods are difficult, will take some time. A broad, open