fourth Corps intended to cover the assault were not prepared until night, Toward dusk I was instructed to throw forward my left, Miles' division, so as to hold the White Oak road and prevent the enemy from sending re-enforcement to their troops at Five Forks, where Sheridan, with the cavalry and Fifth Corps, was attacking them. This was at once carried out, Miles' left, across that road, being supported by one of his brigades in reserve. Mott kept up connection with the rest of the line by a single rank.
An order was received during the evening the evening to assault the Crow-house redoubt at 4 a. m. of the 2nd instant, at which time an assault would be made by the Army of the James, by the Sixth, and by the Ninth Corps. I in my judgment, I could effect a lodgment. In the event of being successful I was to throw forward my command in the direction of the Boydton road, and endeavor to communicate with the troops on my right and look out for my left.
The examinations in the vicinity of the Crow-house redoubt having rendered it highly probable that a column of fours could be led along the edge of the bank of Hatcher's Run to the redoubt having rendered it highly probable that a column of fours could be led along the edge of the bank of Hatchers' Run to the redoubt, General Hays was ordered to assault the redoubt in that manner at 4 a. m., without the use of artillery. The other division commanders were directed to feel the enemy closely at the same time, and if any chance offered to assault.
At 9.15 p. m. I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac informing me General Sheridan had routed the enemy west of Dinwiddie Court-House, had captured several batteries, over 4, 0000 prisoners, and several trains. To prevent re-enforcement being sent to the troops he had encountered I was directed to feel at once for a chance to get through the enemy's line, and if one was found to assault immediately and push forward. This order, with suitable instructions, was communicated to the division commanders. At 9.30 p. m. the order was modified by a communication from the guidance, by which I was advised to push every reserve from my left, and if the enemy were found breaking from my front to push directly froward; if the enemy could not be broken then Miles' division should be sent down the White Oak road to Sheridan. A subsequent dispatch fixed the hour for Miles to move to Sheridan. A subsequent disproved by that time I had not broken the enemy's lines or started them. Generals Miles and Mott attacked and drove in the enemy's picket-lines, but the entrenchments, the heavy slashing in front of which I have before described, did not offer assailable points. The enemy were found to be vigilant, and opened heavily with their artillery. Such being the condition of affairs in my front, General Miles moved down the While Oak road to join General Sheridan, between midnight and 1 o'clock, in accordance with the views of the commanding general of the army of the lieutenant-general. Communication with the cavalry along that road had been previously opened by General Miles with a detachment from my escort. As soon as Miles' division was well out of the way, leaving the advanced picket-line as it was established, I disposed the two divisions on the line held by the three the day previous.
About 2 a. m. of the 2nd instant I received an order suspending my attack upon the Crow-house redoubt, in consequence of the absence of one of my divisions (Miles'), and was directed to hold myself ready to take advantage of anything that might arise in the operations of the