mend them and the officers they have named in their reports to special notice. The officers and men of the batteries maintained the well earned reputation they had already gained on many fields.
To my staff-Brevet Colonel Warner, inspector of artillery, Brevet Major Craig, assistant adjutant-general, and Brevet Captain Worth, Eight Infantry, aide-de-camp-I am indebted for the prompt manner in which their duties were performed. Colonel Warner's duties were co-extensive with the army; they were promptly and ably performed. Captain Worth, in additional to his duties on my staff, served actively on the staff of the major-general commanding in carrying and transmitting orders on the field.
In my previous reports I have had occasion to all attention to the want of a proper proportion of field officers for the artillery, and this I did especially in the reports of the battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg; and as there is no bureau of artillery nor other center of administration for it, I take this occasion to present the same subject in order that the results of our experience may not be lost. This is due to the reputation of the artillery in this war, as well as to the future interests of the service. At an early period of the war orders were given that field artillery should be taken into service only by single batteries "in order to save field officers;" this whilst infantry regiments of a single battalion were allowed four, with their proper staffs. Why this policy, so contrary to that of all modern armies and so destructive to the efficiency of the most complicated of all the arms of the service, was adopted I am at a loss to discern. Its effects have been but too clear. Not only has the service suffered form the want of officers absolutely necessary to its highest efficiency and economy, but this system has stopped promotion in the artillery, and, as a consequence, nearly every officer of promise as well as of nay distinction has been offered that promotion in the infantry, cavalry, or the staff which no amount of capacity, gallantry, or good conduct could secure him in his own arm. The result is that, with a few marked exceptions, in which officers were willing to sacrifice their personal advancement and prospects to their love for their arm, the best and most distinguished of the officers of the artillery accepted positions elsewhere or left the service in disgust, as opportunity offered. The effect of this and of other errors of organization has been but too evident; the artillery, although it has does much better than under the circumstances could have been expected or even hoped, has not attained to that efficiency which was possible, and has failed to retain the pre-eminence it once held in our Army and in public estimation. This sacrifice of efficiency has been made at the expense of economy. I do not hesitate to say that the field artillery of this army, although not inferior to any other in our service, has been from one-third to one-half less efficient than it ought to have been, whilst it has cost from one-third to one-half more money than there was any necessity for. This has been due principally to the want of proper organization, which has deprived it of the experienced officers required for its proper command, management, and supervision, and is in no respect the fault of the artillery itself.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY J. HUNT,
Brevet Major-General, Commanding.
Colonel GEORGE D. RUGGLES,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.