2 a. m. of the 2nd, and slept awhile at a refugee camp, as I could not find my own.) Our infantry picketed the road at Fisherville, but spent the night in its own camp. General Rosser had but few men, twenty or thirty, to watch the enemy's movements. Pleasant, but chilly.
Thursday, March 2.-Wharton's division was put in line of battle at an early hour at Waynesborough, the left at the edge of the woods northwest of town, and the right at the barn back of Gallagher's, with two pieces of artillery on the right, one just in rear and near the railroad and ne more to the right on the river road. After the enemy advanced, four pieces were taken to the left wing and disposed along it. The enemy came on very early and drove in our pickets and destroyed the railroad bridge over Christina's Creek, and it was then reported that they had gone back, and the troops were ordered to the wood to make fires to protect themselves from the cold sleet which was constantly falling; but before the order could be sent news came that they were advancing in force, and the general and staff went on the hill on the northeast of the railroad. About 2 p. m. the enemy came on and formed a line of battle about a mile in front of Waynesborough and one the right of the road, deploying skirmishers along our front and to the left. We opened artillery on them, especially from our left, and did them some damage, compelling them to fall back and breaking their line, and it seemed from appearances through the sleet that they were falling back, but about 3 p. m. they massed, and moving through the woods turned our left flank, which made a feeble resistance and give way, followed by the giving way of the whole line, and one of the most terrible panics and stampedes I have ever seen. There was a perfect rout along the road up the mountain, and the enemy (all of the force being cavalry and mounted infantry) dashed rapidly forward into the swarm of flying men, wagons, &c., and pursued over the mountain at Rockfish Gap, capturing over 1,000 prisoner and all the artillery and train. No artillery had been posted on the other side of the river, as i had suggested to General Long, so there was nothing to check the enemy. The mud was very deep, and it rained and sleeted all day and became very foggy. The whole army was captured or accoutered, and we had no cavalry to id us, a sit was back toward Lexington. The general committed an unpardonable error in posting so small a force with aswollen river in its rear and with its flanks wholly exposed, the left hain an interval of one-eighth of a mile between it and the river and with a body of woods that concealed every movement that might be made. The only precaution taken was to have boards put ont he railroad bridge for a foot bridge in the morning. The only other recrossing was a foot bridge by the roadside, two or there feet wide. Nothing was done to cover a retreat. I had just gone to the fire to warm when the stampede began. I went to that stable and got my horse and rode rapidly across the river, expecting to find artillery on the hill there, and by it said rally the men who were crossing by the railroad bridge; but, to my surprise, there was none there, and the situation, as I turned and saw it, convinced me that all was lost, especially when I saw general officers rush by me in the headlong stampede. So I rode rapidly on toward my wagon and got my saddlebags and reports, and had my servant mounting his horse when the enemy came and commenced firing and compelled me to go on. I went up the mountain at a gallop, the road full of fugitives and the foe yelling "Stop! Stop! behind and firing constantly. I left the road near Lipscomb's and took tot he right into the woods; was soon joined by another man on horse-back, and shortly after by Antrim, of Waynesborough, and we kept on