ceiving after night-fall that they had recommenced their work, I again attacked them about midnight, shelling their camp with good effect. At daylight the enemy in strong force marched upon Waynesborough. Most of my command had necessarily been sent some three miles after forage. We quickly concentrated and hastily threw up barricades, while a single regiment held the entire column in check. This rough screen was hardly completed when a general charge was made upon our lines, which was repulsed, with considerable loss to the enemy. A second, third, and fourth charge were made by the enemy, each of which was repulsed and driven back by counter-charges. Finally their long lines of infantry advanced, and, after warm fighting, their cavalry having turned our flanks, we were compelled to fall back, which was done by taking successive positions till we reached the town of Waynesborough. Here we were so warmly pressed that it was with difficulty we succeeded in withdrawing from our position. The moment our lines left our works I directed the Eight Texas (Colonel Cook) and the Ninth Tennessee [Battalion] (Captain Bromley) to charge the enemy, which was gallantly done, meeting and driving back a charge of the enemy, and so staggering him no further demonstration was made upon us until we were prepared to receive the enemy at our new position north of the town. During all the enemy's charges the loss of men and horses must have been severe. According to his own account his loss in men numbered 50 killed and 147 wounded. The enemy remained in town about three hours and then moved down the Savannah road. During all the engagements the enemy's cavalry were at least double my own numbers, and were, besides, re-enforced by one or more divisions of infantry.
Having been notified by the lieutenant-General commanding that the roads toward Savannah had been blockaded by his order, and having sent Lewis' brigade (re-enforced by the Fourth Tennessee Regiment) to fall back before the enemy, I with the remainder of my command, remained to protect Augusta and to strike his flanks and rear.
Of the first day I attacked his rear several time, driving him from his several positions, killing and wounding a great number and capturing about 100 prisoners. During his movement toward Savannah so warmly was he pressed that be blockaded the roads in his rear, frequently building fortifications two or three miles in length, and destroyed all bridges on his line of march. He occasionally attacked us by charging with his cavalry, which was invariably met by counter-charges and driven back in confusion with heavy loss. In every fight we captured horses, arms, and prisoners.
On the night December 8 we shelled the camp of the Fourteenth Corps with good effect, throwing the corps into confusion and causing it to leave camp at midnight, abandoning clothing, arms. &c. By breaking up the camp during the extreme darkness a great many negroes were left in our hands, whom we sent back to their owners. We also captured three wagons and teams, and caused the enemy to burn several more wagons. The whole number of negroes captured from the enemy during the movement was nearly 2,000.
On the 8th we captured a dispatch (see Appendix A) from General Slocum to General Davis, giving the proposed location of Sherman's army before Savannah, which afterward proved to be correct. This paper was forwarded to General Hardee. On reaching a point within ten miles of the city, and finding it impossible to do any further harm to the enemy in that position, I moved back and crossed the Savannah River, leaving General Iverson's command to watch the enemy should he move