commander will turn over the trains to Brigadier-General Kenly, and will remain at Winchester and garrison that place with his command until further orders. The brigade commander detailed by you will, between this point and Winchester, have supreme control and management of the train, and will be held responsible for its safe arrival at Winchester.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAS. W. FORSYTH,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Staff.
NOTE.-The officer commanding brigade detailed will report at these headquarters at 5 a. m. to-morrow in person.
CAMP NEAR MIDDLETOWN, VA., August 13, 1864.
Captain A. J. MCGONNIGLE,
Chief Quartermaster, Dept. Middle Military Division:
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of my report in relation to the movements of the transportation of the army.
The trains started from Blivar at 10.30 a. m., August 12, and were ordered to march in the following order: First, Sixth Corps trains; second, Nineteenth Corps trains; third, Army of Department of Virginia trains; fourth, Cavalry Division trains. The Sixth and Nineteenth Corps left in regular order, followed by the Army of Department of Virginia trains, but, for some unexplained reason, the cavalry trains did not get into position as promptly as they should have done, and did not leave Bolivar until 4 p. m. About one mile before reaching Berryville the trains halted to water, and then moved on at abut 11.30 p. m. While the trains were pulling out the Cavalry Division trains came up, unhitched, and fed, without orders. When their turn came to start they wee not ready, with the exception of the new brigade train, under charge of Lieutenant Pinkham, acting assistant quartermaster, which I ordered on, and proceed to raise the officers in charge of the other cavalry trains, ordering them to start immediately. Much time was lost in getting them off, and at about 4 a. m. I discovered that the Reserve Brigade (in charge of Lieutenant Dean) was not ready, and no officer could be found in charge of said train, not even a wagon-master. I immediately commenced awakening the drivers myself, and had them nearly ready to start, when we were fired upon by a party of about 100 men with one piece of artillery. The opened upon us with two shells, and prepared to charge. It was impossible to corral the train, as it was not hitched up, and I reported to the lieutenant-colonel in charge of the rear guard for instructions. He had none to give, and I there-fore made a detour of the hills, took charge of the trains already passed, and left in the valley about forty-four teams. I lay the entire blame of having this train delayed, first, to the officers allowing their teams to be unhitched and fed without orders; second, to the absence of any officer in charge of the Reserve Cavalry Brigade train. had these officers awaited orders, and been ready to move when order, the entire train would have been beyond the point of attack. The enemy drove back the rear guard, destroyed a few wagons, and drove off a small herd of cattle. I have not full particulars, and cannot officially give them.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. C. MANN,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, First Division, Nineteenth Army Corps, and Acting Chief in Charge of Transportation.