road to Cedar Creek, the advance driving the enemy's pickets four miles beyond and forming a junction with the pickets of Torbert's cavalry on the Strasburg pike. Rations and forage were brought up and issued. On the 21st moved, at 5 a.m., to Lebanon Church, where I awaited orders until 7.45 a.m. Merritt's division was withdrawn from my left, and I was left alone, with instructions to move on the Middle and Back roads until stopped by a superior force of the enemy, keeping up my connection with the right of the infantry line. As there is but one road besides the pike leading by Fisher's Hill, with the exception of some blind lanes, I moved along the Back road and across the country, driving the enemy's outposts until a line of rail and earth breast-works was reached, behind which the enemy had a strong line of infantry or dismounted men. I informed the major-general commanding that cavalry could not carry the position without co-operative movements of infantry, and that an infantry corps, by hugging the base of the North Mountain, might break around the enemy's left and render his position untenable. The major-general commanding inspected the line in person and directed me to keep up a strong show of cavalry before it, which was done until the ensuing morning, when I pressed it as closely as possible with dismounted men. About 3 p.m. of the 22nd a division of the Sixth Corps attacked on the left of my immediate front, enabling me to carry the line, after which the enemy was driven by my division about a mile into his main works. General Crook's command passed along my rear through a ravine to my right and assaulted the enemy's extreme left in conjunction with one of my brigades, which leaped the works and scattered the enemy in wild confusion, pursuing the fugitives seven miles up the Valley, while Crook's command passed toward the center. The country was only practicable for cavalry along the Back road; toward the center of the enemy's position it is broken and wooded. The guerrillas were busy with Crook's rear, picking up his stragglers, and my remaining brigade protected it, pursuant to a request from Major-General Crook, to whom I had been directed to report, and guarded our own and the captured artillery, collecting prisoners and property. The Second Brigade captured 110 prisoners, 175 horses, 14 wagons, 8 ambulances, 4 guns, 4 caissons, and 2 battle-flags.
This report is made from the verbal reports received at the time. The division was not entirely assembled at midnight. The sounds of battle had died away on my left and rear with daylight, and a darkness succeeded through which it was difficult to find the way. Trains of ambulances, ammunition wagons, with guards and stragglers, were constantly coming up, requiring directions as to their destination. No information was received from the left and no instructions came from the major-general commanding or any one else. A staff officer, who had been sent to obtain information, returned and reported the operations on the left concluded and the army at a halt.
At daylight the ensuing morning I pushed on over a rough country road, sending scouting parties out to the left to communicate with the troops on the pike. Lieutenant Wakefield returned with one of these parties when I was within six miles of Woodstock, and reported the army was four miles behind. A staff officer sent to Major-General Crook returned with the message that I "had done exactly right," and if no orders had yet been received by me to move on. The road was so hilly and indirect that I was delayed, so that upon my arrival at Woodstock I found the major-general commanding already there. Calling upon him, he informed me that I had made a mistake in not