because it shows distinctly what part was taken at that time in the battle by the First Brigade of my division, and that can be shown in no other way.
Third. I saw with my own eyes from the midst of the open ground over which the second line of the Second Division had just charged that line enter the wood beyond and immediately come out in a panic. It is a fact of which my senses could not be unaware. I am not likely to be deceived as to time or to imagine what does not take place. Officers near me saw the same thing. The events which followed are in consonance with what I saw.
Fourth. I have been unable to find any one among the officers of the regiments of my division who at any time saw any one of them broken. Certainly, in passing from the extreme right to the extreme left of my lines, receiving constant reports from staff officers, or, when stationary, awaiting them, it never was intimated to me that a regiment faltered. I have heard that, when a portion of the First Brigade was retiring, for certain reasons supposed to be good at the time, under the direction and by the order of the officer in command, it was supposed they were falling back before the enemy; among others, that General Grover supposed so, and, with the gallantry for which he is distinguished, at once went to rally them, but he made the same mistake that all did moving back under orders to receive ammunition. After patient investigation I have not been able to find that any regiment of my command moved on that day, except through an order from competent authority. But had been gratifying to me to have heard that it had been promptly rallied and turned against the enemy; and that gratification would have been heightened, I trust, had I known that the work was done by one who had voluntarily taken upon himself the duty. The glory and honor given to others is not taken from ourselves.
Fifth. the order referred to in the fifth point required that my command should move at daylight of the 22nd of September to occupy certain ground held the night before by a division of the Sixth Corps; it was, at the same time, required that my right should connect with the left of the Sixth Corps. At the same time that I received this order, I received information from he commanding officer of the left division of the Sixth Corps that his command would move more than the length of a division from his right, and that I must follow his division to connect. He added that he should make the move before daylight. The earliest dawn at the time was between 5 and 5.30 a. m. I ordered that my division should follow the Sixth Corps and move at 4.30 a. m., and connect with its left. Allowing for the usual and unavoidable delays in very early moves, I considered this a proper execution of the order, particularly after the information I had received from the division commander of the Sixth Corps, who would be on my right and with whom I was to connect. He would move before day; it was a move several hundred yards nearer the enemy' it was important that his left should be covered, and that seemed to me the most important point. I directed a staff officer of my own to conduct each brigade. These staff officers did so, and were with the brigades at 3.45 a. m. The brigades were well commanded and the commanding officers well informed of what was required of them. The duty was neither a difficult nor a hazardous one. My headquarters were in so close proximity that I could be present at a moment's warning, so I did not go to the junction of the right of my command with the left of the Sixth Corps