War of the Rebellion: Serial 089 Page 0018 OPERATIONS IN SE. VA. AND N. C. Chapter LIV.

Search Civil War Official Records

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, October 1, 1864-8 a. m.

General HUMPHREYS,

Chief of Staff:

I find the enemy still in position near the Pegram house, where they were last night, and they are making pretty strong demonstrations on General Ayres' right near the Chappell house.

They are also opening with artillery on General Ayres' and General Griffin's positions. I expect a hard time.

G. K. WARREN,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, October 1, 1864.

General HUMPHREYS,

Chief of Staff:

I have withdrawn Hofmann's brigade from the Pegram house, as it was subjected to a cross-fire of artillery, and sent it to re-enforce General Ayres' right. General Ayres has repulsed the assaults upon him. Lieutenant Colonel E. S. Otis, commanding First Brigade of Ayres' division, is mortally wounded. He is a great loss.

G. K. WARREN,

Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, October 1, 1864-10 a. m.

Major-General WARREN,

Commanding Fifth Corps:

Mott's division is ordered to report to Parke. Gregg is also put under his orders. The commanding general directs that as soon as General Mott joins General Parke you both attack the enemy in your front, and endeavor to turn his right flank. General Meade will start soon for Peebles'.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS, October 1, 1864-11.30 a. m.

Major-General HUMPHREYS,

Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: Nothing special has occurred since my last dispatch. We are at work all along the lines, strengthening the and making roads. I ordered the withdrawal from the Pegram house of Colonel Hofmann's brigade, which was threatened at the time of the attack upon General Ayres. It is, in a measure, a necessity to occupy the line we hold, and that leaves no force to attack with. The quiet of the enemy may indicate that he is intrenching a new line or preparing to attack. We are not strong enough to act offensively, in view of the uncertainties of the enemy's positions, numbers, and movements, but we keep feeling them. A mistake on our part might enable the enemy to reoccupy the points we