16. On the 23rd 110 men, veteran artillery of the Tenth Regiment North Carolina, 50 sailors, and the Seventh Battalion Reserves, about 250 strong, and thrown into the fort.
17. The guns and defense on the land front were in perfect order at the time referred to, except two disabled guns on the left. Nineteen guns in position. Palisades in perfect order, and the mines the same, the wires not having been cut.
18. Possible, yes; probable, Numbers The work was very strong; the garrison in good spirits and ready, and the fire on the approaches, the assaulting columns having no cover, would have been extraordinarily heavy. In addition to the heavy guns I had a battery of Napoleons, on which I placed great reliance. The palisades alone would have been a most formidable obstacle.
19. No difficulty at all by the river.
20. The garrison at the second attack was somewhat stronger, but not altogether of so good material.
21. No; and it is a matter of grave charge against General Bragg that the whole force was not captured on the 26th. He had the force and the position.
22. There was great difference in position of the ships in the two attacks, and in the nature and effect of the fire. The first was a general bombardment, not calculated to effect particular damage. The second firing had for definite object the destruction of the land defense, and the ships were placed accordingly, to destroy them by enfilade and direct fire on that front and the northeast salient. The whole enormous fire was continued without intermission until the slope of the northeast salient was practicable for assault. Not a gun remained in position on the approaches; the whole palisade swept away; communication with the mines cut off, rendering them useless, and the men unable to stand to the parapets during the fire. There was all the difference in the world.
23. In the second attack the fire was continuous during the night; not so heavy at night, but enough to prevent repair and to keep the garrison from rest and food. The land guns all disabled; field pieces only left to depend on.
24. I do not. Neither attack was practicable in the presence of the supporting force, provided that had been under a competent officer. The first landing ought assuredly to have been captured entirely; and as for the second, although deriving much greater advantage from the different mode of attack by the fleet, and though pressed with great vigor, it is due to the supineness of the Confederate general that it was not destroyed in the act of assault.
W. H. C. WHITING,
Major-General, Provisional Army, C. S., Prisoner of War.
Numbers 2. Report of Brigadier General Adelbert Ames, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, Twenty-fourth Army Corps.
HDQRS. SECOND DIV., TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
December 28, 1864.
CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of this division since the 7th:
At sunset on the 7th this command, numbering about 3,500 officers and men, left its camp and marched to the left of our lines near the