to the defense of these places, must soon be returned to replace the 100-days' men now guarding depots and camps of prisoners of war. Dispatches received yesterday indicate preparations for an insurrection in Louisville and other parts of Kentucky. I ordered to Louisville two regiments from Nashville, which General Miller says is about one-half of his force. General Burbridge has been directed to give his particular attention to Louisville.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 17, 1864-9 a.m.
I forward a dispatch* received from Major-General Burnside. It appears the enemy have become apprised of the mining operations and are countermining. The report made last night informed you that it would be a week before operations against the salient which takes Burnside's mine in reverse could be commenced. I see no object in exploding this mine before the advantages gained by it can be followed up. Nothing occurred worthy of report on other parts of the line. All the enemy's old works have been leveled.
GEO. G. MEADE,
HEADQUARTER ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 17, 1864-9 p.m.
Several deserters have just come in, all concurring in the statement that Longstreet's corps is to make an attack to-night. One man said General Field had visited the picket-line just before he deserted and he overhead him talking with a colonel on the details of the movement. The deserters say it is generally believed in their army that Johnston is gone unless he can be re-enforced, and before they can re-enforce him they must beat us back. Warren and Burnside are warned and we are almost anxious the experiment should be made.
GEO. G. MEADE,
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
In the Field, City Point, Va., July 17, 1864-9.20 p.m.
Major General GEORGE G. MEADE:
Your dispatch of 9 p.m. just received. No doubt all preparations have been made to repel an attack if one is made. I have duly notified the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, so that they will be in a state of preparation also. We should be ready not only to repel but to follow up the enemy if he should come out of his lines, and especially so if the attack is made near daylight, as it likely will be if made at all. It is very apparent to me that the enemy must come out, for if they do not relieve Johnston nothing but unforeseen circumstances can save him.
*See Burnside to Williams, 9 a.m., p.300.