CITY POINT, VA., June 21, 1864.
The only word I would send General Hunter would be verbal, and simply to let him know where we are, and tell him to save his army in the way he thinks best, either by getting back into his own department or by joining us. If we had the enemy driven north of the Appomattox I think he would have no difficulty in joining us by taking a wide sweep south.
U. S. GRANT,
CITY POINT, VA., June 21, 1864-10 a. m.
Looking at the position of our troops, as marked on the map by General Barnard and colonel Comstock, it looks to me as if a concentration of artillery about your present left would hold the enemy within his present lines, while you take up a position crossing the Jerusalem road. When you get there in force I do not see how the enemy can hold his present line; you certainly will have it in reverse. Wound it not be well to have the fifth and Ninth Corps hold a threatening attitude when you move to the left, and be prepared to advance on to and occupy the enemy's line the moment he wakens it? I do not give this as an order, knowing that you are better posted on the topography of the country over which you have to operate than I am, but to suggest attention to what seems to me, from the map, practicable.
U. S. GRANT,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 21, 1864-11 a. m. (Sent 11.15 a. m.)
Telegram 10 a. m. received. I do not fully understand your views. Can you not send barnard and Comstock here to explain them? I shall be most glad to carry them out whenever I fully understand what it is you propose to do.
GEO. G. MEADE.
CITY POINT, VA., June 21, 1862-11.30 a. m.
Your dispatch of 11.15 just received. General Barnard was on his way to Petersburg when it came. My desire is that Petersburg be enveloped as far as possible, without attacking fortifications, and the way the position of the two armies is marked it looks as if the front of the enemy can be swept from about Warren's left or left center, thereby giving our troops the position desired without exposure, unless the enemy exposes himself equally. I do not know that the threatening attitude recommended for the troops left to hold ground already ours will be so advisable as to hold our front with a thin line, and form as