lously done, no ammunition even being unloaded, except to put upon the wagons. Major-General Butler established a telegraph office at the landing for the service of the train, and gave me a detail of two companies of the One hundred and thirty-eighth Ohio National Guard for ordnance duty. They were relieved on July 15 by two companies Thirty-seventh New Jersey Volunteers, which, on August 28, were replaced by a detachment of 100 men of the Eleventh Connecticut Volunteers, under command of Captain Kraszynski. Brigadier-General Ingalls, chief quartermaster armies in the field, supplied a tug and a train of fifty wagons, with a promise of further transportation when required. Besides these wagons the four artillery teams of Captain Korte, Third Pennsylvania Artillery, attached to my command, have been habitually used. This battery was organized by General Butler for the purpose of moving all his heavy guns, its regular armament being two 8-inch siege howitzers, which themselves would hardly require transportation other than that furnished by the quartermaster's department. Captain Korte has always been eager for service and much benefit has been derived from this organization. Lieutenant Colonel N. L. White was appointed by General Butler acting inspector-general of my command of June 29, and besides his other duties has discharged the functions of that office in a thorough manner. Captain S. P. Hatfield was placed in command of the depot, assisted by First Lieutenant W. C. Faxon and First Lieutenant C. Gillett, all of First Connecticut Artillery. Captain Hatfield had commanded a siege battery during a part of the Peninsular Campaign of 1862, and had been ordnance officer of my brigade in the defense of Washington for more than a year. To his high professional attainments and energetic character, and to the zeal and ability of his assistants, the excellent administration of his department during the campaign is to be attributed.
The general system for the service and supply of the batteries was the following: The companies and parts of companies serving the batteries, situated within convenient distance, were placed under command of a field officer of First Connecticut Artillery, who received his orders as to firing from the local commander. In other respects he received his orders from these headquarters. The battery commanders forwarded daily to their majors reports showing the amount of ammunition on hand at last report, amount received during the twenty-four hours, amount expended, and amount remaining on hand. These reports were collected by orderlies from my headquarters and usually reached the depot about noon. A train was at once fitted out to supply the deficiencies below a certain number of rounds (usually 100 per gun or mortar) ordered to be kept in the field magazines. These trains reported to the field officers, already informed by telegram of their destination and time of starting and were conducted after dark under their directions to their proper batteries. Although some 900 tons of ammunition, hauled an average distance of nearly seven miles by wagon, have already been fired during the campaign, in no single instance has a battery failed to be amply supplied for ordinary or even extraordinary demands, and in no case has a useless accumulation of ammunition occurred. The question of responsibility for ordnance property, so difficult of convenient adjustment, has also been very simply settled for the siege train. The whole material remains charged to the ordnance officer. Memorandum receipts, which are destroyed when the property is accounted for to him, being only required from battery commanders. No time is thus expended upon unnecessary