Question. How much of the time on the march out did your brigade guard the train?
Answer. Four days out of eight on the march out.
Question. Was the march from La Fayette to Stubbs' made as rapidly as it could have been?
Answer. No, sir; it was not.
Question. How much sooner could it have been made?
Answer. We were seven days marching from La Fayette to the camp near Stubbs. We could have made the same march easily in four days over the same roads, and could have gained another half day by taking the best roads.
Question. Do you mean that the train could have been got through in that time?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How much was the march retarded by the train not keeping up?
Answer. The train delayed the column on one day five hours on account of the heavy rains and bad roads, and one hour each on two other days on account of the pioneer corps having slighted their works and not repaired the road so that the train could pass. I do not know that the column was delayed by the train at any other times.
Question. State what orders you received and the operations of your brigade on the 10th of June.
Answer. First was the order of march, to distribute four men to each wagon of the general supply train. The FIFTY-fifth was distributed along the train. The FIFTY-ninth and Lamberg's battery were in the rear of the train. We marched in this order, keeping as well closed up as possible, until about 11 o'clock, when we first heard artillery firing in our front. At 2. 30 o'clock as the head of my column reached the crest of the hill, near the white house, I first came in sight of the battle-field. This was about 900 yards this side of the creek. At this point the officers in charge of the train received orders to corral the train. They commenced parking the train. Part of the train was run forward to the field just this side of the creek, and they had not finished parking that part of it when they commenced moving it out again. At this point I ordered my men to leave the wagons and form companies and to come forward as rapidly as possible by the flank of the train. While they were forming companies I went forward to the creek. At this time the cavalry were coming back from the front; in fact, I met some of them back nearly as far as the white house. From the point where I was I discovered a gap in our main line, through which the rebels were approaching. I went back, brought up two companies of the FIFTY-fifth, under Captain Ewing, and posted them in that gap under a heavy fire. Every commissioned officer of those two companies was killed or wounded in ten minutes. The men stood their ground until I sent an officer to bring them back. I then went back and got seven companies more of the FIFTY-fifth, brought them up, and posted them a little to the right and rear of the other two companies, so as to hold the ground where the other brigade was giving away. I then went back to the ridge by the old house, met the other company of the FIFTY-fifth, which I told to wait there for orders. I sent a staff officer back to bring up the battery and the FIFTY-ninth as quickly as possible. At this point I met Colonel McMillen. He said, "Colonel, where are your troops, what are you doing, and what are you going to do?" I told him what I had done, and the arrangements I had made. I told him I was going to put the battery in position on the ridge near the old house, put the FIFTY- ninth in position on its right and the company of the FIFTY-fifth on its left, bring the other companies of the FIFTY-fifth to that place, and fight the enemy as long as I had a man left; to which he said, "That's right; if you can hold this position until I can go to the rear and form on the next ridge you can save this entire command. It all depends on you now. " That was the only order I received during that day after leaving camp in the morning. I did not see Colonel McMillen or General Sturgis after that until 11 o'clock that night, when I overtook them at the Hatchie bottom. I formed line on the ridge in accordance with the plan I suggested to Colonel McMillen, and immediately opened on the enemy with my battery, to cover the retreat of the other troops. The right of my line, being more advanced than the other portion, became almost immediately