nothing since the morning of the 10th. They had been marched up five or six miles on the double- quick to the fight, and were soon defeated and turned on the retreat. They were without rations; many had thrown away or destroyed their arms, and all the infantry near the rear had reduced their clothing as much as possible, hoping to keep in advance of the rear guard; but the general in command was leading the retreat so rapidly that I was obliged to leave hundreds every mile who were unable longer to keep up. Our horses, too, were fast giving out, and I could not get more than ten men from a company with horses able to overtake the command after stopping to check the advancing rebels. With such a small force it was not safe to remain far from the main column, so about 2 p. m. I started for the front. We were then leaving men very fast, who could keep up with ordinary marching, but were unable to keep up while marching as fast as we were. I asked General Sturgis if he would not march the column slower, as it was impossible to keep a well- organized rear guard while it was marching so rapidly, as we were losing all our infantry who were unable to keep up. The general ordered a halt, and we had a little rest. It was near night, and Colonel Karge, commanding Second New Jersey Cavalry, was sent to take the rear, but he soon sent word that the enemy were pressing him, and the march was at once resumed and continued all night.
We arrived at Collierville, Tenn., about 10 a. m. of June 12. To this place the railroad was in running order and 2,000 troops had arrived there from Memphis with supplies for men and horses. The dismounted men and what infantry had succeeded in getting through were taken to Memphis on the cars. About 12 o'clock the six companies which were cut off at Ripley came in, under command of Captain Woods, and reported that the enemy had not troubled them after leaving Ripley. We considered ourselves perfectly safe here with the re- enforcement of fresh troops from Memphis, but the general did not so consider it. Soon after sundown we received orders to march. We left Collierville about 9 p. m., and arrived at White's Station, seventeen miles, before daylight. This was the THIRD night without sleep, and my men and horses were very tired. About sunrise I received orders to send 250 men back to Collierville to protect a train which was going to Collierville for a lot of our infantry who had come in soon after we left. I sent all the men and horses that were able to go, under command of Captain Huff, of Company A.
I have no mens at the present time of knowing the exact number of killed, wounded, and missing in my command, but it was heavy. I am sorry to have to say that the officers and men of my command have no confidence in the general commanding the expedition.
I should be happy to mention in this report the names of all the officers and men who are entitled to special notice, but in so doing I should have to name most of my command. The battalion commanders, Captain Woods, Captain Dee, and Captain Abraham deserve much credit for their personal bravery on the field before the retreat, and the prompt manner in which they handled their commands in guarding the rear after the retreat; also Lieutenant Woodruff, acting adjutant of the regiment, for his promptness in clearing the bridge over Tishomingo Creek an removing our horses from immediate danger.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. R. PIERCE,
Major, Commanding Regiment.
N. B. BAKE,
Adjutant- General of Iowa.