placed but little faith in this report, yet disseminated it freely for the good effect it might produce upon the troops. In a few minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and disheartened, arrived himself and reported his lines broken and in confusion. The new line, under Colonel Wilkin, also gave way soon after, and it was now impossible to exercise any further control. The road became crowded and jammed with troops, the wagons and artillery, sinking into the deep mud, became inextricable, and added to the general confusion that now prevailed. No power could now check or control the panic-stricken mass as it swept toward the rear, led off by Colonel Winslow, at the head of his brigade of cavalry, and who never halted until he had reached Stubbs', ten miles in rear. This was the greater pity, as his brigade was nearly, if not entirely, intact, and might have offered considerable resistance to the advancing foe. About 10 p. m. I reached Stubbs' in person, where I found Colonel Winslow and his brigade. I then informed him that his was the only organized body of men I had been able to find, and directed him to add to his own every possible force he could rally as they passed, and take charge of the rear, remaining in position until all should have passed. I also informed him that on account of the extreme darkness of the night and the wretched condition of the road I had little hope of saving anything more than the troops, and directed him, therefore, to destroy all wagons and artillery which he might find blocking up the road and preventing the passage of the men. In this way about 200 wagons and 14 pieces of artillery were lost, many of the wagons being burned, and the artillery spiked and otherwise mutilated; the mules and horses were brought away.
By 7 a. m. of the 11th we had reorganized at Ripley, and the army presented quite a respectable appearance, and would have been able to accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but for the unfortunate circumstance that the cartridge-boxes were well night exhausted. At 7 o'clock the column was again put in motion on the Salem road, the cavalry in advance, followed by the infantry. The enemy pressed heavily on the rear, and there was now nothing left but to keep in motion, so as to prevent the banking up of the rear, and to pass all cross-roads before the enemy could reach them, as the command was in no condition to offer determined resistance, whether attacked in the front or the rear.
At 8 a. m. on the 12th the column reached Collierville worn and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for two days and two nights without rest and without eating. About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis bringing some 2,000 infantry, commanded by Colonel Wolfe, and supplies for my suffering men, in I determined to remain here until next day for the purpose of resting and affording protection to many who had dropped by the wayside, through fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening that the commander at White's Station had information of a large force of the enemy approaching that place from the southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to offer serious resistance to an enemy presenting himself across my line of march, I informed the general commanding the district by telegraph that I deemed it prudent to continue my march to White's Station. Accordingly, to 9 p. m. the column marched again, and arrived at White's Station at daylight next morning.
This report having already become more circumstantial than was anticipated I have purposely omitted the details of our march from Ripley