CALHOUN, September 2, 1864.
Brigadier General WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE:
My regiment is here-440 officers and men, all well armed, equipped, and mounted. Can I not bring them at once to the front? Please answer.
WM. J. PALMER,
Colonel, Commanding Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry.
HDQRS. CHIEF OF CAVALRY, DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,
September 4, 1864.
Colonel Palmer has ben ordered to report for orders to General McCook, and the order has been reiterated to him; but no reply received to the dispatches. I send the order again to him.
W. L. ELLIOTT
Brigadier-General and Chief of Cavalry.
DECATUR, ALA., September 2, 1864.
Major-General THOMAS, and
The following telegram was sent to Major General Rousseau, which is nearly a repetition of two sent some days since. No transportation has arrived. It is now too late to come through, as the road is cut in several places. I have heard of no bridge being burned.
HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NORTHERN ALABAMA,
Decatur, Ala., September 1, 1864
I deem it indispensable to the safety of the road-indeed the only plan that suggests itself to me for its protection against so large a force as Wheeler's on the road-that a train or trains [be prepared] capable [of] carrying 1,500 infantry and two pieces of artillery-mounted artillery. The horses must go with the guns. This force to go up the road as far as Columbia, and fight the head of Wheeler's columns. With this force I would be nearly 2,000 strong at Columbia, and with the cavalry at Pulaski 3,000. If this suggestion is accepted, will you please send the transportation at once. I have the Thirteenth Wisconsin, One hundred and second Ohio, and Seventy-third Indiana Infantry.
R. S. GRANGER,
HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, September 2, 1864-8 p.m.
You know that General Garrard reports General Slocum in possession of Atlanta. I have sent couriers to learn the exact truth. If it be so, we don't care about pushing the enemy any farther at this time. Had we prevented his making intrenchments it would have been well, but as he has a strong line, I do not wish to waste lives by an assault. You may therefore order the skirmishers close up, but hold your lines so as not to suffer much. If the enemy be gone in the morning occupy his lines to your front and await orders.
W. T. SHERMAN,