not "weaken Cleburne to aid Bate. He thought two of Walker's brigades had better be brought from south of the river; one to be placed on right of Hood and one on the left-on Bate's right, where he joined Hood, the weakest point. If Walker could not be brought up Loring's second line could be spared very well." (Walker had already been ordered up, two brigades being in reserve in woods on south bank; Stevens' [brigade] guarding crossing on the Calhoun road.)
On returning to headquarters General Walker's troops were just coming up the road; delivered message. General Johnston rode off to put Mercer in position behind Stewart; was soon followed by General Mackall. After remaining behind a short time to forward dispatches, &c., join the general on high hill to the left of point where Dalton dirt road and railroad meet. About 6 p. m., Hood driving enemy rapidly. I am sent to tell him that Mr. Wigfall had just taken two brigades of General Walker's division in behind Stewart; that a third brigade of Walker's would soon be up (part of Loring's division; Featherston's brigade also brought up.) I was directed to say also that preparations must be made to continue the movement (swinging around our right) at daylight next morning. "Let the troops understand it." Rhode up Dalton and Resaca dirt road in search of General Hood; inquired but could learn nothing of him; turned back to near the hill where I started from and went up the railroad. There, in a cut where Stewart's line was in the morning, were Generals Johnston, Hood, Walker, and Mackall. I reported to latter I had taken wrong road, &c. Presently two prisoners were brought in and questioned by the generals; not communicative. A third brought up said their line of battle ran northeast and southwest; he belonged to Whitaker's brigade, Stanley's division, Fourth Army Corps. They expected to be victorious, had massed their forces near our bridge. About dark Wheeler came up to the cut, and after consulting brought up his cavalry which went out the railroad. All then rode in to the little house behind Seleden's battery where headquarters are at night.
The enemy did not offer much resistance to Hood's right; batteries libeled up and fell back at the approach of our skirmish line. All in good spirits at gaining ground and the railroad, and at the prospect of renewing the attack at daylight and cutting the enemy off from Snake Creek Gap. On the way to headquarters for the night it was found that a severe engagement had taken place on Polk's line. As we attacked on the right, Sherman, supposing our left weakened, promptly assaulted our lines and the battle raged hotly according to all accounts for an hour and a half. The firing, strange to say, was not heard where we were. Major Clare says he reported that the enemy had effected a lodgment on the hill opposite tot he house where headquarters were established the night of General Johnston's arrival from Dalton.
When we reached the house heavy firing of musketry was going on. Accounts confused. Some said hill was to be retaken; two regiments were ordered to retake it by one of the generals on the line. Hardee at headquarters on General Johnston's arrival; General Hood had accompanied the general. About same time news received from General Martin that enemy had crossed Oostenaula (two divisions). Featherston, of Lorinng's command, who had been sent to report to Hood, was ordered to move promptly and occupy trenches south of Selden's battery. Walker and staff sent for. Only six of