their trains, 200 horses and mules, and 200 prisoners, the balance of the garrison on being driven from the town retreating to a small but strong fortification near the town. We also captured and destroyed a block-house and water-tank some two miles below the town. General Martin had been ordered by me to capture a small force of the enemy and destroy the railroad from Tilton up toward Dalton, while I was to meet him by working down from Dalton. Thought I had ten miles farther to travel than General Martin, he failed to comply with my order, and embarrassed me by placing his command where I could not hear from him, which caused me to fear he had met with disaster or been prevented from joining me by some force of the enemy interposing between him and myself, all of which gave me much uneasiness. Humes' and Allen's commands destroyed the railroad for several miles. the stores captured in the town were either appropriated or destroyed. Unfortunately we captured but little corn, and none could be obtained in the neighborhood.
While moving out of the town the following day I was attacked by a large force of infantry and cavalry under Major-General Steedman. My loss was trifling, that of the enemy more severe, and including, according to their own accounts, 1 colonel killed and General Steedman slightly wounded. After leaving the town I found General Martin had been within seven miles of me behind a ben din the river, but had not even informed me of his position, much less marched to my assistance, in compliance with his orders. This and other circumstances convincing me I could not expect any help from him, I as soon as possible placed him in arrest and sent him back to the army.
Williams' brigade destroyed the road at various points between Tunnel Hill and Graysville, and by making demonstrations at various other points the enemy were prevented from any attempt to repair the railroad until after the 20th, when we left its immediate vicinity with the main body of my command to carry out the rest of my orders. This work was accomplished under the most disadvantageous circumstances, the heavy rains having so completely saturated the ties and all other wood as to make it almost impossible to burn them. Before leaving I detached 200 selected men, with orders to strike the railroad every night at some five or six designated points. These parties were very successful in their efforts, succeeding in running off some twenty trains during my absence in Tennessee. The interruption of railroad communication by the destruction of the road was for fourteen days, commencing on the 9th, the day the road was first struck near Marietta. This does not include interruptions caused by the detachments of 200 men sent back by me upon leaving Dalton. My horses were in a suffering condition, having during the march subsisted upon an insufficient supply of green corn, scarcely more than half matured, and so soft as to be easily crushed by a slight pressure of the hand. This alone made it impossible for me to remain on the railroad any longer, and compelled me to seek the rich soil on the Ocoee and Hiawassee to save my command from becoming dismounted.
I had intended to cross the Tennessee River at Cotton Port, but the continuous rains which had fallen since I left the army had raised the Tennessee River some ten feet, making it impossible to ford any point below Kingston. After maturely considering the matter I concluded to move above said point, and by crossing Little