the woods on my right, and then moved to the front. Having waited long enough, as I supposed, for him to get 200 or 300 yards in advance of me, and engage the enemy as soon, if not sooner than I could (and my understanding from the plan of battle was that he was to engage the enemy first and rather on his flank), I immediately ordered my brigade to move upon the enemy. This order was promptly obeyed by the whole command. The order was promptly obeyed by the whole command. The order I received was to attack the enemy whenever his lines were reached, and if he was found behind works to fix bayonets, charge, and take them if possible; that the firing was to be a general one along our lines, and the victory to be made as decisive as possible. These instructions were given to my regimental commanders and strictly obeyed by them. The whole command dashed forward with eagerness and rapidity, crossing the creek without difficulty, passing through the strip of woods on the left of the brigade, the open space on the right, and entering the field occupied by the enemy. No halt was made, but the movement was forward and rapid. After entering the field a volley was fired, and the enemy's lines were charged from the right to the left of the brigade. This advance and this charge were made under a very heavy and destructive fire from the enemy's batteries and small-arms. The line of battle ran from east to west not far on the south side of Peach Tree Creek. The enemy seemed to be formed in at least two lines of battle and not to have been in position long, as the works occupied by the front line were incomplete; still they afforded great protection in a fight. I have learned from prisoners captured that Hooker's corps and one division of Howard's held this part of the line.
My brigade drove them from the works and held them for several minutes, but was exposed to so destructive and galling a fire not only from the front, but also from the right flank, that it was compelled it was protected by the crest of the hill and the timber. Here it was again formed in line, the right forming in the open space between the strip of timber and the woods on the right of the brigade, where it was protected to some extent by the rising ground in its front. In this position the fight was continued until after dark, the parties being in easy range. The attack by the division on my right was not made as soon as I expected, nor as soon as I thought was contemplated by the order of battle. Had the attack by that division been made before, or even at the same time, my brigade engaged the enemy, I think we could have held his works, driven him farther back, captured his batteries, and probably a large number of prisoners. The division on my right did not engage the enemy (or, at least, the left brigade did not) until my command had retired to the strip of timber, or second line, which it held until ordered to withdraw. What caused this delay on the part of the division on my right in making the attack I am unable to state, as I had no conversation with the division or brigade commanders either before or since the battle. I was ordered by the major-general commanding to withdraw my brigade to the trenches at 9 o'clock on that night, leaving my skirmishers on the field until 11 o'clock, which order was obeyed. I succeeded in removing my dead and wounded, except those who fell in, near, and beyond the enemy's works. Brigadier-General Scott's brigade, on my left, advanced with me and attacked the enemy at the same time. The two brigades were in one line and had no support or reserve. Brigadier General John Adams' brigade was relieved