as to prevent the enemy from gaining that road. He was ordered to hold the enemy in check on a line nearly parallel with the Lick Skillet road, running through to Ezra Church. General Lee, finding that the enemy had already gained that position, engaged him with the intention to recover that line. This brought on the engagement of the 28th. General Stewart was ordered to support General Lee. The engagement continued until dark, the road remaining in our possession.
On the 27th of July I received information that the enemy's cavalry was moving round our right with the design of interrupting our communication with Macon. The next day a large cavalry force also crossed the Chattahoochee River at Campbellton, moving round our left. Major-General Wheeler was ordered to move upon the force on the right, while Brigadier-General Jackson, with Harrison's and Ross' brigades, was sent to look after those moving on the left. I also dispatched Lewis' brigade of infantry down the Macon railroad to a point about where they would probably strike the road. The force on the left succeeded in reaching the road, tearing up an inconsiderable part of the track. It was the design of the enemy to unite his forces at the railroad, but in his he was defeated. The movement was undertaken by the enemy on a grand scale, having carefully picked his men and horses. A Federal force, under General Stoneman, moved farther south against Macon. He was defeated by our forces under Brigadier-General Iverson. General Wheeler, leaving General Kelly to hold the force on the right, moved against that already at the railroad. He succeeded in forcing them to give battle near Newman on the 30th, and routed and captured or destroyed the whole force. Too much credit cannot be give General Wheeler for the energy and skill displayed. He captured 2 pieces of artillery, 950 prisoners, and many horses, equipments, &c. Brigadier-General Iverson captured 2 pieces of artillery and 500 prisoners. Believing the enemy's cavalry well broken, and feeling myself safe from any further serious operations of a like nature, I determined to dispatch a force of cavalry to the enemy's rear, with the hope of destroying his communications. I accordingly ordered Major-General Wheeler, with 4,500 cavalry, to effect this object. He succeeded in partially interrupting the enemy's communications by railroad. This still left sufficient cavalry to meet the necessities of the army. This is sufficiently shown by the fact that several determined cavalry movements were subsequently attempted and successfully met by our cavalry. From this time till the 26th of August there is nothing of any particular movement to mention. The enemy gradually extended his right, and I was compelled to follow his movement; our entire front was covered with a most excellent abatis and other obstructions. Too much credit cannot be given the troops generally for the industry and endurance they displayed under the constant fire of the enemy. On the 26th of August the enemy abandoned his works on the extreme right and took up a line, the left resting in front of our works on the Dalton railroad and extending to the railroad crossing the river. Again he withdrew, on the night of the 27th, across the Utoy Creek, throwing one corps across the river to hold the railroad crossing and the intermediate points. His left then rested on the Chattahoochee River, strongly fortified and extending across the West Point railroad. The corps defending the crossing of the Chattahoochee, his works on this side of the river, and the obstacle formed by