number of railroad trains arriving loaded with troops. The depot being within full view of our skirmish line, I could after daylight see these troops arrive, debark, and go into position. I, therefore, in order to prevent these re-enforcements on the part of the enemy, ordered a battery of two light 12 pounder Napoleon guns to be erected in front of, and within 1,000 yards of, the depot and surrounding houses; this battery could also play on the enemy's line in my whole front. The site of this battery was about 200 yards to the right and 120 yards to the rear of my line. I, therefore, ordered a very strong support of infantry, commanded by Captain Bowman, Ninth Iowa Infantry, and Lieutenant Eicks, Twenty-ninth Missouri Infantry to support this section, Lieutenant Haug, of Fourth Ohio Battery, commanding. Another section of 12-pounder light Napoleon guns, commanded by Lieutenant Hust, of same battery, was in position in the center of the refused line on the right flank. In these operations the rebels resisted us with some determination. I was now ordered to send two of my largest regiments, the Seventy-sixth Ohio and Thirtieth Iowa, of the First Brigade, to support the left of the first line of our corps, Second Division, while the two regiments of infantry which covered our right flank were relieved by a brigade from the Sixteenth Corps. I refer to the annexed plan for the position of my troops.* The section commanded by Lieutenant Haug was ready to open fire about noon, and did so with telling effect. The infantry, however, had not as yet completed their intrenchments and at 2.30 p.m. there was still a considerable gap in the works connecting them with the refused line on the right. While I was still engaged in pushing forward this part of the work, considerable movement was observed on the rebel side. Colonel Wangelin, commanding Third Brigade, reported that very heavy columns of rebel infantry had sallied from their left and advanced in double-quick around our line of skirmishers, evidently with the intention of passing to our right and rear. The rebels had to pass over on open field to the right of Colonel Wangellin's front, and this gallant officer opened a most withering fire on them, but was unable to prevent their flanking maneuver. Lieutenant Haug's shells exploded with terrible precision among the enemy, but with no better success. Regardless of this destructive fire, the enemy's columns rushed forward, and I, of course, directed Lieutenant Haug to withdraw his pieces, while Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Eicks were ordered to hold their position at all hazards until the guns were withdrawn. These two officers gallantly held their position while Lieutenant Haug removed his section with admirable precision; when I brought this party back into our main work, the rebel avalanche was at our very heels. I placed Lieutenant Haug's section of artillery and the supporting infantry, under Captain Bowman, and Lieutenant Eicks, in position on the left of the rifle-pits occupied by the Sixteenth Army Corps and Lieutenant Hust's pieces. They all opened at once a most deadly fire on the rebels (the artillery with canister), whose front line was now within 100 yards of ours; at the same time the troops of Colonel Williamson's brigade, who formed the connection with the refused line, poured their fire into the assaulting column. Here I cannot omit to mention the splendid conduct of the officers and men of the Fourth Iowa
*See p. 138.