the accompanying sketch for the position of my troops. The ground in front of this line sloped off toward a creek, distant about 250 yards. The bed of this creek is very deep and abrupt, and, owing to its formation, not only gave complete shelter to the enemy's sharpshooters, but was wide enough to permit the collection and formation of large masses of troops without our notice. A constant skirmish fire was kept up on the 27th and up to the afternoon of the 28th, when about 4.30 p.m., the firing increased consdirably. Whilst it was yet comparatively quiet in my immediate front, the enemy's musketry and artillery fire on the right of the line of the Fifteenth Army Corps (held by the Fourth Division) was terrific, and seemed to advance. I at once ordered the Second Brigade (Colonel Williamson), held in reserve, to fall in. While doing so I received General Logan's orders to march these reserves to the support of the threatened wing (Fourth Division). Sending word to General Woods to take command of the First and Third Brigades in case of emergency, I at once led the Second Brigade on double-quick to the extreme right, arriving just in time to assist our comrades of the Fourth Division in repelling a fierce assault, deploying on the extreme right of the army corps. Colonel Williamson, commanding brigade, and the officers commanding regiments, deserve praise for the prompt and energetic manner in which they executed this maneuver and enabled us to gain and hold a position forbidding any further attempts on the part of the rebels. The assault was not, however, restricted to the Fourth Division front, but ran all along the lines of our corps. As soon as I saw, therefore that the Second Brigade was well secured, I repaired to my front proper, and on arrival found the First and Third Brigades and the four 12-pounder gun battery most excitedly engaged in repelling rebel columns. These had formed in and sallied from the ravine in my front, mentioned before, and had come up to within fifty yards of my line, but only to be moved down by the hundred and to fall back broken and shattered. Numbers of dead and wounded were left to us to bury and to care for. The behavior of the men and officers on this occasion was brave beyond description, and it is impossible to mention individual names. The management of the troops by General Woods and Colonel Wangelin was only such as could be expected from such brave and experienced officers. The enemy, after this most decisive defeat, was very slow in re-establishing his skirmish line. Desultory firing continued from the 29th to the 31st of May, only once assuming greater proportions when, a little before midnight of 30th, the enemy probably in the belief that we were evacuating our lines, made a demonstration, but finding our men all there and on the alert, desisted from all attempts at a serious attack. On the 1st of June we finally left the Dallas lines and moved round to relieve troops of the Cumberland Army near New Hope Church. There we were stationed until June 5, when we found the enemy gone from our front. The division left same day, and moved to Acworth,on the Atlantic and Western Railroad, and remained there in camp from June 6 until the morning of June 10. In the morning of the last mentioned day we advanced farther south and encamped near Big Shanty, a station about three miles north of Kenesaw Mountain, where the enemy was reported to be strongly intrenched.
Next morning (June 11) I was ordered to make a reconnaissance in force in order to develop the rebel position. A narrow belt of