colors. They nobly dashed through a hail-storm of lead and iron, which belched forth from all the enemy's batteries and rifle-pits. Reaching the base of the hill they climbed the slope, and running over the crest of the first undulation in the eminence, fairly effected a lodgment, under cover of a dip in the plateau. The hurrahs of the thousands of admiring friends followed the onward march of this command. The enemy at first started by the appearance of our lines of steel, rallied again, and for two long hours fought most desperately for the repossession of the very important position our brave men had gained. We lost heavily, but General Woods and his men repulsed all attempts on the part of the enemy to dislodge them. (I refer to the general's report for the splendid and decisive part taken by my command in this assault.) The severity of the struggle rendering re-enforcements imperative, I at once dispatched the Twenty-fifth Iowa and Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first Missouri Regiments of Infantry to the scene of strife. To support the charge of General Woods, the Twelfth Missouri Infantry had been ordered to rally its left wing on the Resaca road, and to throw its right wing, deployed as skirmishers, forward to the base of the hill to be assaulted in order to protect the column against a flank fire from the enemy's works. The Twelfth executed the order well, but lost considerably in the gallant strife. Toward night-fall they were relieved by a regiment from another corps.
The pioneers and all available tools were put in requisition during the night to dig rifle-pits, construct batteries, and to build bridges, and prepare fords across Camp Creek, so that by daylight the whole command was secured against any coup on the part of the defenders of Resaca. (I respectfully refer to the accompanying sketch,* which shows the relative positions of the troops of the First Division.) The assaulting party, under General Woods, forming the front line, the Twelfth and Seventeenth and Thirty-second Regiments of Missouri Infantry were held in reserve near the bridge. The section of 12-pounder howitzers, in battery near the bridge, commanded its immediate front and protected the left of General Woods; the four 12-pounder Napoleon guns, in their position in the gap itself, brought the whole field with a horizon of almost 100 degrees under their fire, while the 3-inch ordnance and 20-pounder Parrotts played on the town, forts, and railroad. The remaining regiments of infantry were drawn up in line on the left of the these batteries, their skirmishers occupying all the open ground in their front. Our position was very secure, so much so that the enemy did not even threaten it after his unsuccessful attempt on the night of the 14th. A slow fire, both of artillery and small-arms, was kept up all day on the 15th, but the enemy did not give any evidence of offensive intentions, and after midnight the flames from burning houses and railroad bridges proved that the place was evacuated. Early on the morning of the 16th I moved into town, followed by the Twelfth Regiment Missouri Infantry, and occupied the works, driving the enemy, whose rear-guard was just across Oostenaula River, beyond the range of my section of 12-pounder howitzers.
I inclose the reports of my brigade commanders and of my chief of artillery, also a nominal list of casualties during these operations amounting to: Killed - commissioned officers, 2; enlisted men, 29. Wounded-commissioned officers, 7; enlisted men, 186. Missing-enlisted men, 8. Total-commissioned officers, 9; enlisted men, 223.