I moved my command through Dallas, over the Pumpkin Vine road, and a by-road leading to the main Marietta road to the rear of General Hooker's command, which I relieved at once with my troops. The position of the troops while at this point is shown in plan Numbers 3.* Harrow's division was on the right, M. L. Smith's in the center, with Colonel Williamson's brigade, of Osterhaus' division, on the left the other two brigades of Osterhaus being in reserve, one behind the right and the other behind the left of my line.
From the 1st to the 5th of June skirmishing was continuous. Wherever at all possible my lines were pushed nearer the enemy's. By daylight on the morning of June 5 the enemy had evacuated his works and retreated. On the 5th of June, in accordance with Special Field Orders, Numbers 30, Department and Army of the Tennessee, I moved my command on two roads, running nearly parallel with and to the rear of our lines, to Burnt Church, and thence to Acworth, arriving at the later place on the morning of the 6th. Passing through the town, I moved on the Marietta road about two miles out, and disposed of my troops to command the road and the adjacent open country, Harrow on the right, Morgan L. Smith in the center, and Osterhaus on the left, and remained in this position until June 10. At 6 a. m. of June 10, as directed in Special Field Orders, Numbers 34, Department and Army of the Tennessee, I moved in the advance on the Marietta road, carrying ten days' subsistence, with about 150 rounds of small-arm ammunition per man. Smith's division had the advance, followed by divisions of Harrow and Osterhaus, respectively. The infantry skirmishers of the enemy were found posted about one mile south of Big Shanty Station behind slight rail piles, from which they were soon dislodged by our artillery. It was soon evident that the enemy intended making a decided stand, and that they had a formidable line of works in front of Kenesaw Mountain. This line was developed crossing the Marietta road at the distance of two lines and a half from Big Shanty. On the east and west of the road the course of the main line was not determined for several days, the enemy keeping his wings well advanced, and erecting several lines of temporary works, retiring afterward from one to another of them as he was pressed by our troops. On the 11th light skirmishing continued during the day, and on the 12th I advanced Osterhaus' division one mile, driving the enemy into their main line of works, in our immediate front. The position of these works, and of our subsequent movements in front of Kenesaw, is shown in the accompanying plan, Numbers 4.* I caused a line of works to be thrown up within as short a distance as practicable of the enemy, and occupied them with the troops of General Osterhaus. His batteries shelled the enemy vigorously, electing comparatively feeble and ineffective response. On the 13th the enemy was reported to be moving within the apparent intention of turning the left flank of the Army of the Tennessee, formed by the Seventeenth Corps. By direction of General McPherson, I moved M. L. Smith's division by the left flank to the rear of General Blair, to support him, if necessary. On the 14th the position of my command remained unchanged. Skirmishers and artillery were constantly engaged. On the 15th I moved General Harrow's command, by direction of General Mcpherson, to the extreme left of the Army of the Tennessee, and formed it perpendicular to the main line of General Blair's command, thus placing it
*To appear in the Atlas.
7 R R-VOL XXXVIII, PT III