repeatedly sent my staff officers, and went twice myself, ahead to see if I could hurry up those in front. The road was a narrow, devious path, crossing innumerable ditches and bogs, and I was led to believe that these obstacles were the cause of delay to the rear of the column. In one of these expeditions I came upon Lieutenant Hill, of the division staff, who informed me that the head of the column was eight or nine miles in advance, and that he had been left by the general to hurry me up. I simply pointed to the train of pack-mules passing and waited the arrival of the advance of my brigade, which was pressing on their rear. A few miles farther on we came to the bridge over White Water, where I found Captain Le Roy, assistant adjutant-general, who stated he was directed by the general commanding the division to call on me for a company to remain with him until daylight and then to burn the bridge. Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly was directed to furnish the company. About two miles farther on I found Captain Mitchell, acting inspector-general, who had been left by the general to hurry me up. He rode with me a few hundred yards, when we found the road completely blockaded. Captain Mitchell went ahead to discover remedy, if possible, the difficulty, and I have since learned from him that he found the packtrain in front so sound asleep that nothing short of his saber could arouse them. After a long time, and when it was nearly daylight, my front was cleared and the pack-train dashed off at a gallop. I followed at the same gait and repeatedly sent my two staff officers and orderlies to the rear to impress upon the regimental commanders the importance of keeping closed up, as I apprehended that the enemy would strike us in flank by some of the many roads that tapped the one we traveled from the north. We had galloped on for about seven miles when a messenger from Colonel Kelly informed me that he had been attacked in rear. The next moment a number of men of the Fourth Kentucky who had escaped, galloped up, reported the regiment completely surrounded, and the enemy pursuing the rest of the brigade, and the report of their carbines in my immediate rear confirmed the truth of this report. The First Tennessee was placed in position, covering the road where it crossed a small stream, with directions to destroy the bridge and cover the rear from that point to Newman, about ten miles. The rear was covered without difficulty by that regiment, assisted by detachments from the Eighth Iowa.
I promptly advised the general of the condition of affairs in the rear, to which he replied that I must hold the enemy in check, as he was apprehending an attack in front. At Newnan Colonel Harrison's brigade took the rear, and we followed the artillery in rear of the Second Brigade. Several miles southwest of Newana, the general commanding the division rode back to the head of my brigade, advised me that the enemy were in front and on our right flank, and directed me to put my command in position, covering a road leading to the right. The regiments were wheeled right into line, the Eighth Iowa on the left, the First Tennessee on the right, and what of the Fourth Kentucky was there in the center. The whole dismounted and moved forward 100 yards. Skirmishing began and continued some time in front of my right and of the brigade on the right; the latter were ordered forward, the enemy soon driven off, and I was ordered to mount my brigade and move on. The general commanding the division informed me that the rebels were on the road in front in front and between us and the advanced brigade. He directed me to send a regiment down the road to open