gained any material advantage, Colonel Croxton, commanding Fourth Kentucky Mounted Infantry, whom I had ordered the day previous to proceed to the front by way of Ship's Gap, arrived, and immediately attacking the enemy caused him to make hasty retreat in the direction of Alpine, leaving his dead and many of his wounded in our hands. Our forces pursued a short distance. The enemy's loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners is estimated at 300, about 80 of whom of whom were prisoners, among them several officers. Our loss does not exceed 60. The conduct of all is reported as being highly commendable. So soon as I could learn the results of the affairs at La Fayette I ordered pursuit, but owing to the condition of Colonel Watkins' horses, and Colonel Croxton having started for the front before the order could reach him, it could not be executed with any hope of overtaking the enemy. Had an immediate pursuit been made, I have no doubt but that it would have been attended with good results. I respectfully transmit herewith the official reports of Colonels Watkins and Croxton.
On the 28th of June my force was increased by Brigadier-General Smith's command, the Third Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, headquarters at Kingston, Ga., and occupying the railroad from Tilton to Cartersville, and soon after to Allatoona, the forces at that station and Etowah being ordered out of my district. With the exception of the capturing and partly burning of a rain near Tilton on the 6th of July, and a temporary break of track at that place, no raid or military demonstration of importance was made within the district by the enemy until about the 14th of August, when, early in the morning of that day, the enemy's cavalry, in considerable numbers, attacked a herd of cattle near Calhoun, Ga., dispersing a portion of the guard and driving off a large number of battle, some portion of which were recaptured by Colonel Faulkner, who pursued the attacking party on the first receipt of the news. At 3 p. m. that day I received information that rebel General Wheeler, with a strong force, was moving toward Dalton. I immediately ordered such troops as I thought I could safety spare from the garrison at Chattanooga to be held in readiness to move on the receipt of orders. At the same time I ordered sufficient railroad transportation to be put in readiness to accommodate 2,000 men. At 6 p. m. I received the further intelligence that a demand had been made by Wheeler for the surrender of Dalton, which had been refused. I at once ordered the loading of the troops, but owing to several trains running in wild from Dalton, I did not reach the bridge north of that place until after midnight, when, being told by a cavalry officer direct from near Dalton that our forces had been overpowered and capture, I awaited daylight before proceeding farther. At daylight I advanced my command; soon became engaged with the enemy's skirmishers. About this time I heard firing in Dalton, and learning that the garrison was still holding out, I moved forward rapidly and soon cleared the town of the enemy, but being without cavalry I could not pursue. I remained at Dalton until the following day, when learning that the enemy had no further design on the place, and fearing that he would attempt to destroy the bridges over the Chickamauga, I started for Chattanooga, where I arrived on the 17th instant. The enemy's loss at Dalton could not have been less than 200. He left 33 dead and 57 badly wounded on the field. My loss was 1 officers and 8 men killed, 1 officer and 29 men wounded, 1 officer and 23 men missing; total, 63. The troops engaged were