changed the formation of the brigade from one line in echelon to two lines, putting three regiment in the front line and two in the second, throwing out in front a strong line of skirmishers. This formation, made in a very hurried manner, being completed, I gave the order to advance. Promptly and regularly the men moved up the hill and drove the enemy from the crest in the most gallant manner. When about two-thirds of the way the left of the line, in passing out the woods to the left and in front of me. Not knowing what, if any, disposition had been made to protect our left flank, and fearing a flank movement from the enemy, I charged the front of the Seventy-third Ohio Volunteer Infantry so as to meet the threatened danger. A few well-directed volleys from this regiment seemed to silence the firing from the woods. Soon afterward I saw troops of the First Division (Brigadier-General Williams) going into position on my left, which removed all fear of a flank attack. I then ordered the Seventy-third Ohio to resume its original front and move forward on a line with the other part for the brigade on the crest of the hill. The hill was divided by an indentation in its top, running in the same direction with the line of battle, in two crests. In my front the crest first reached in a measure overlooked and commanded the was obeyed, although the position of the men was such that they were under fire of the enemy in their works. As I anticipated before the attack began, my right regiment was too far to the right, as there was some mistake or misunderstanding on the part of the Second Brigade. I understood that the Second Brigade was to support the First Brigade on the right, but before the crest of the hill was half gained the regiments of the Second Brigade, after firing a volley into the First Brigade, were found on its left in no little confusion. The men ran over and through the right of my line, mingling with the right regiment and creating so much confusion as to render the regiment (Twenty-sixth Wisconsin) almost unserviceable, as well as causing great hindrance to the regiment next to it (Thirty-third Massachusetts). Major Winkler, with commendable skill and ability, with no little difficulty extricated his men from the confused mass into which they had become involved and bough them again reformed into line. The hill being a position of much importance to the enemy, it was not to be supposed that he would yield it without a struggle or without making an effort to retake it after being driven off. Accordingly, regimental commanders were cautioned that they might expect to be in turn attacked, but that they must hold the position at all hazards. The expectation seemed to be well founded, for the enemy made two furious assaults upon my line, but was gallantly and successfully repulsed.
As the second attack seemed to be avery determined one, and as my men were much exhausted, I sent word for re-enforcements. I knew that General Geary with hi division was in my rear and with a considerable force near the crest of the hill. I went to him in person for aid. I failed to obtain it, and the second and last attack on my line was now far spent, my men were exhausted; the casualties had been large. At my request Major-General Hooker ordered my brigade relieved by troops from the Second Division. After being relieved, I marched the brigade into the valley on the dalton road,