later by the troops of our First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps. August 6, about daybreak in the morning the troops of the Twenty-third Army Corps were withdrawn from my left to be transferred to the extreme right, and were replace by the First Division of our corps, commanded by Brigadier-General King. The operations of the two corps for that day again were detailed and promulgated in a lengthy order from Major-General Schofield, issued the night previous, but as the part to be performed by my division was dependent upon the movements of Brigadier-Generals Cox and Hascall, who were expected to turn the enemy's left flank or to break through his line in the vicinity of the Sandtown road, and as those movements did not appear to be carried into execution, my men remained in their works. It was on the same day that Major-General Palmer relinquished the command of the Fourteenth Corps and turned it over to Brigadier-General Johnson. August 7, the First Division having made arrangements to push out and take the skirmish pits of the enemy, corresponding with those captured by my men on the 5th, I ordered a strong demonstration along my whole line to aid them. In some places my works were so close to those of the rebels that the men could not go out of them, but in others the skirmishers were pressed out strongly and a sharp encounter of some duration ensued. It ended in my advancing my left regiments some 200 yards, and those on the right, which had been retired, came up on line with the others. Brigadier-General Morgan moved forward at the same time and our divisions joined near the junction of the Sandtown and Lick Skillet roads. In the operations of that day I lost 66 men killed and wounded. The loss in the First Division was of course heavy, but it gained both prisoners and an advanced position. I have been thus minute and circumstantial in my narrative of events since coming in contact with the Twenty-third Army Corps, inasmuch as complaint was made to the major-general commanding the Department of the Cumberland that the Fourteenth Corps had failed to accomplished its portion of the work marked out, when, in point of fact, every advantage of any kind that was gained from the time we moved to the right up to the 8th of August was achieved by the Fourteenth Corps. August 8, from this date until the 26th the general position and disposition of my troops was not changed. The necessary location of our camps was such that they were constantly exposed to the enemy's fire, and there were few points at which a man could show himself without the risk of being shot. On certain portions of the line a temporary truce would be arranged with the troops that chanced to be in front whilst at others a vicious skirmish would be kept up, and for days the men would be imprisoned in their trenches, not daring to show their heads above the parapet, and this varied by the fire of artillery or more active demonstrations begun by one or the other party. In this passive condition, with no operations on hand, our daily reports presented not unfrequently a list of 10,20, or 30 casualties, and the long continuance of the confinement and privation were extremely trying, yet the men bore all with a degree of cheerfulness, patience, and heroism that can find its reward only in the consciousness of duty well performed and of devotion to the holy cause in which they were engaged. During our long stay in such close proximity to the enemy, deserters from their lines, chiefly from Alabama regiments, came in constantly and in large numbers. They finally became so numerous that the most strenuous means were resorted to by the rebel officers to prevent them.