verified my own previous observations and the report of Brigadier-General Carlin, I ordered the attempt to be given up. My loss from the enemy's artillery in this affair was unusually heavy, the battery on Chattoogata Mountain and one near their left, and which I judge to be on the eastern slope of Rocky Face, burst their shell among us with remarkable accuracy.
May 10, we remained in the position in which the previous night had left us, skirmishing being kept up all day along my whole line. During the day I caused the bridges over Mill Creek (which, owing to the dam thrown across the stream within the gap by the enemy, was here too deep to be conveniently forded) to be repaired and others built to facilitate the withdrawal of my troops in case such a movement should be ordered, or their re-enforcement in case if should be thought advisable to renew the attempt to carry the mountain. Late in the evening, having obtained the consent of the major-general commanding corps to the withdrawal of one brigade, I gave orders that Scribner should relieve Carlin's brigade and then strengthen his position by intrenchments, and that Carlin, upon being relieved, should withdraw across the creek to the position from which he had at first advanced. Before these orders could be carried into execution, however, a heavy rain-storm coming on, I consented, at the request of General Carlin and Colonel Scribner, that the movement should be postponed until morning, directing Carlin, however, to keep an eye upon the bridge, and to cross at once and notify me in case there should be indication of a rise in the stream sufficient to carry them away. The night passed, however, without the anticipated disaster. At 3.40 p. m. of the 11th, in pursuance of orders received from the major-general commanding corps, I sent off my wagon train, with the other trains of the corps, toward Snake Creek Gap, to which place, on the 12th, I marched with my division, following that of Brigadier-General Baird, and arrived at a late hour in the night. Early on the morning of the 13th, pursuant to instructions received during the night previous, I replenished my supply of ammunition, issued rations, and got my troops under arms ready to march, but owing to the crowded condition of the only road from our position into Sugar Valley, it was nearly noon before we got fairly in motion. I moved out on the Resaca road about one mile, and then, under the direction and personal supervision of the major-general commanding corps, formed to the left of this road in double line, Carlin's brigade on the right. King's on the left, and Scribner's in reserve (then out as skirmishers), and advanced in a direction nearly east for about four miles over a very broken and heavily wooded country, the lat mile of this distance my skirmishers driving those of the enemy before them. About one mile beyond the military road, constructed by the enemy from Dalton to Calhoun, we found the enemy in force and strongly posted, and the purpose of the movement being, as I understood, accomplished, I halted, by order of Major-General Palmer, corrected my lines, and waited for further instructions. My division remained in this position skirmishing with the enemy until, late in the evening, relieved by that of Major-General Butterfield. My instructions were as soon as relieved to form on the left of General Butterfield's division, my line being slightly refused from his, but it was found impossible at the late hour at which his troops got into position to form the new line with any probability of its approximating to correctness as to position, or scarcely as to direction. At daybreak on the following morning,