the Army of the Tennessee and pass to the south and rear of the enemy. Having discovered the withdrawal of our forces, the enemy, on the afternoon of the 12th, commenced a counter movement, the object of which was to turn our extreme left, then held by the cavalry, under General Stoneman, and the Second Division, of the Fourth Corps (General Newton). The movement was early discovered by the signal officers on the northeastern point of the crest of Rocky Face Ridge. General Newton reported his position as perilous and asked for assistance. I immediately moved with the First and Third Brigades of the division to his support; but the re-informant was not in the end needed, as the enemy, after a bold display of force, and apparently inviting a movement, which if boldly pushed, might have seriously interfered with our plans, drew off without bringing matters to an issue. During the night of the 12th the enemy evacuated Buzzard Roost Pass, the crest of Rocky Face Ridge, his defensive works on the roads east of the ridge, and at Dalton. Early in the morning of the 13th I moved with the First and Third Brigade, following the Second Division, into Dalton, by the roads east of Rocky Face Ridge. The Second Brigade followed the First Division through Buzzard Roost Pass. Thus was the enemy forced from the first of the series of strong defensive positions which he had occupied to resist the progress of our arms into Georgia. Halting a brief time in Dalton to unite all its parts, the Fourth Corps soon continued its march southward, and camped for the night several miles south of that place. The march of the day was made without any serious opposition.
A few of the enemy's stragglers were picked up and some light parties, covering his retreat, encountered. The forward movement was resumed early the morning of the 14th. A march of a few miles effected a junction between the Fourth Corps and the remainder of our forces. It had been discovered that the enemy occupied a strongly intrenched position in the vicinity of and north and west of Resaca. Dispositions were at once made to attack. The First and Second Brigade of my division were deployed in order of battle in two lines, the former on the right, the latter on the left. The Third Brigade was placed in reserve. Thus arranged, at the order the line grandly advanced. By the contraction of our entire front as it closed on the enemy's position, the First Brigade of my division was forced out of line and took position immediately in rear, but followed up the movement. In the advance the Second Brigade soon encountered the enemy's first line, which was rudely barricaded with logs and rails. This wass handsomely carried and the brigade pushed boldly on until it confronted, at not more than 250 yards distance, the enemy's second and far more strongly intrenched line. It was problematical whether this line could be carried by even the most determined assault, such was its natural and artificial strength. The assaulting force would have been compelled to pass for 250 yards over an open field, without the slightest cover, exposed to the most galling and deadly direct and cross fire of artillery and musketry. To hold out the least hope of a successful assault, it was necessary that it should be made simultaneously throughout the line. With a view to making these necessary dispositions the Second Brigade was halted, and to guard it against the dangerous consequences of a counter attack in force (such as fell the same afternoon on a brigade of another division of the corps), its front was at once rudely but strongly barricaded. About 4 p. m. I received an order from Major-