gade was designed to from one of the charging columns to assault the enemy in front of works occupied by the extreme right of the Fourth Army Corps, Colonel Opdycke, in charge of the skirmish line for the division, selected the One hundred and twenty-fifth for skirmishers, ordering that it should push ahead at all hazards, scaling the enemy's works with the head of the column. in case the charge was successful, or protecting the rear if repulsed. I deployed the regiment in rear of our works, at intervals of four feet, placing Major Bruff in charge of the right wing I directed the movements of the left. Between our main works and those of the enemy there was an interval of not to exceed 400 paces. Fifty paces in front, and running nearly parallel to our works, was a ravine, which was the only place between the lines where men were not exposed to fire from the enemy's main works. At the sound of the bugle, fifteen minutes before 10 a. m., the line sprung over the works and moved forward in quick time without firing. We passed the enemy's advance pits, capturing almost his entire line of pickets, and sent them to the rear in charge of wounded men, or without guard when there were not wounded men at hand, as I would not spare well men from the ranks.
As the line advance beyond enemy's rifle-pits it was exposed to a more withering fire, but it moved forward in splendid style till it encountered the abatis in front of his main works, when I halted and lay down to await the charging column. The head of the column no sooner reached the abatis then it, too, was unable to stand the fire, and the men immediately threw themselves flat on the ground; all attempts to again rally them were unsuccessful, although several men struggled through the dense abatis and were cut down while climbing the outer slope of the enemy's works. There was no concerted action, and after maintaining its position fully fifteen minutes the column was forced to fall back. The One hundred and twenty-fifth retired to the pits occupied by the enemy during the morning, and held them half an hour after the column had withdrawn, and until after relieved by fresh troops. The entire loss of the regiment during the engagement amounted to 1 officer killed, 2 mortally wounded, and 8 officers more or less severely wounded; 6 men killed, 8 mortally wounded, and 33 men more or less severely wounded. June 28, 29, and 30, remained in trenches resting. July 1 and 2, remained quietly behind works. July 3, the enemy having evacuated his works during the night, the One hundred and twenty-fifth joined in the pursuit at 6 a. m. and bivouacked at five miles below Marietta near the railroad, confronting the enemy. July 4, changed position and fortified; the enemy withdrew during the night. July 5, marched at 7 a. m. and bivouacked at night near Vining's Station. July 6, 7, and 8, rested in bivouac, men washing, &c. July 9, 10, and 11, moved with the division to support McCook's cavalry, which had effected a crossing of the Chattahoochee River at Roswell, twelve miles above Vining's. July 12, 13, and 14, returned to Vining's Station, crossed the Chattahoochee River at Powers' Ferry. and constructed breast-works at a point two miles father south. July 15, 16, and 17, remained quietly in camp; no enemy appeared in our immediate front. July 18, the entire command moved at 5 a. m.; the One hundred and twenty-fifth was deployed as skirmishers, and was supported by the Sixty-fourth and Sixty-fifth Ohio, and Third Kentucky Infantry. Encountered Wheeler's cavalry, dismounted, supported by a 4-gun battery, At